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FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS
COVENANT AND FEMINIST
RECONSTRUCTIONS OF
SUBJECTIVITY WITHIN THEORIES
OF JUSTICE
JANET MOORE*
In this kingdom
the sun never sets;
under the pale oval
of the sky
there seems no way in
or out,
and though there is a sea here
there is no tide.
For the egg itself
is a moon
glowing faintly
in the galaxy of the barn,
safe but for the spoon's
ominous thunder,
the first delicate crack of lightning.
- Linda Pastan, "Egg"'
the occupation is complete."
- Maxine Waters, D-California, describing
the movement of federal troops into South
Central Los Angeles
2
On one reading, Linda Pastan's poem neatly expresses the endangered
status of the liberal subject-the agent, actor, or protagonist of any moral
drama. The autonomous, self-conscious, and self-constitutive subject has
drawn heavy fire from feminist and other critical theorists, as well as struc-
turalist, poststructuralist, and postmodern philosophers engaged in critiques
of classical liberalism and its social contract theories. These various voices
compose an "ominous thunder" roiling about homo economicus, fissuring and
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1. Linda Pastan, Egg, in The Five Stages of Grief 5 (W. W. Norton, 1978).
2. Don Terry, Riots in Los Angeles: The Overview: Calm Endures with Grief in Los Angeles, NY Times
Al col 6 (May 4, 1992) (quoting Maxine Waters, D-California).
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even exploding the shell that separates and contains his tideless sea, his rad-
ical individuality.
Juxtaposed against the concrete conflict in South Central Los Angeles,
these theoretical battles over the nature of subjectivity seem, like Pastan's iso-
lated egg, merely to reflect light-a galaxy's safe remove from America's most
recent urban firestorm. In contrast, Maxine Waters' words capture an aching
schism in the constitutional subject-the purported "We the People" who cove-
nanted to "ordain and establish" a political order. The acquittal of police
officers who were videotaped beating Rodney King, the post-verdict riots, and
their suppression by local, state, and federal police and military forces demon-
strate the betrayal of that covenant: under welfare-state capitalism, democ-
racy in the United States has yielded not equal liberty, but alienation so
profound as to constitute de facto apartheid. Like lightning, Waters' words
should crease the complacency of liberal America's "pale oval sky," should
shatter dreamless slumber "in this kingdom [whose] sun never sets."
This essay traces connections between the fissures and fault lines scarring
these respective subjects-first, the subject constructed within classical liber-
alism, and, second, the constitutional "subject," the people of the United
States. I trace these connections under the sometimes flickering light of the
covenant paradigm. While evoking various meanings throughout its long his-
tory, covenant nevertheless steadily signifies a promissory relationship of
transformative depth and power. Covenant's implications for intersubjective
relations are described in John Winthrop's 1630 sermon to the Puritans
aboard the Arabella in Massachusetts Bay: "Thus stands the cause betweene
God and us. Wee are entered into Covenant with him for this worke .... For
this end, wee must entertaine each other in brotherly Affeccion, wee must...
make others Condicions our owne .... ,
Working with such covenant imagery, I contend that debates over the
nature of subjectivity have broadly predictable, and arguably antiliberal, con-
sequences for theories ofjustice and their practical applications.4 My thesis is
twofold. First, I argue that covenant is a potent, if ambiguous, resource for
reinterpretations of subjectivity. Second, I contend that a carefully con-
structed, covenant-based political ethic will demand respect for universal
human dignity. Consequently, this ethic will require redress of those
"defects-of access and power" that undermine meaningful participation in
the reinterpretation and satisfaction of liberalism's own "substantive moral
vision." 5 Thus, a covenant-based theory ofjustice will require that liberalism
3. John Winthrop, A Modell of Christian Charity, in 2 Winthrop Papers 294-95 (Massachusetts
Historical Society, 1931) (sermon preached aboard the Arabella, Massachusetts Bay, 1630)("Christian
Charity").
4. In this I differ from Professor Gardbaum. Contrast Stephen Gardbaum, Law, Politics, and the
Claims of Community, 90 Mich L Rev 685 (1992), with Part III of this article.
5. Id at 758, 760. Gardbaum insists that a liberalism freed by communitarian critiques of its
atomism and subjectivism may nevertheless stand "firmly on the substantive moral vision of self-
realization and autonomy." Id. He is less clear, however, how such a vision, prioritizing "autonomy,
choice, and the privacy of the moral life," can systematically establish the conditions necessary for
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surrender not only the myth of the atomistic individual, but, simultaneously,
her untrammeled freedom to pursue her subjectively chosen ends. This will
be particularly true when such "choices" maintain or exacerbate conditions of
domination and exclusion, or the spiritual and political malaise that recipro-
cally feeds, and feeds upon, those conditions.6
This focus on contemporary interpretations of subjectivity and their eth-
ical and political implications continues a discussion begun a decade ago in
Law and Contemporary Problems' symposium on religion. In "The Pluralist
Game," Francis Canavan quotes a "young professor at the Harvard Law
School" as describing the dominant motif of modernity as "disintegration,"
rooted, on Canavan's interpretation, in the "increasingly successful struggle
of the individual self to free itself from the constraint of social norms." 7
Canavan challenges liberalism's claim to neutrality as between values subjec-
tively chosen by th~se unconstrained individuals. In the pluralist game, he
argues, liberalism deliberately stacks the deck in favor of maximizing indi-
vidual freedom. This effects an "unrelenting subordination of all allegedly
objective goods to the subjective good of individual preference." 8
Postmodernity has only intensified the disintegration Canavan discusses.
For example, structuralists and poststructuralists alike reject the very notion
of a self-identical subject as at best unreliable, at worst contentless. They dis-
agree, however, upon whether the socially constructed systems of meaning
and practice to which "man" is ultimately reducible are either discernible or
stable. 9 On another front, postmodernists sing requiem for the metanarra-
tive, the overarching interpretive construct providing criteria of truth and,
consequently, of ethical self-definition.' 0 Finally, psychoanalytic theory
that vision's own fulfillment, much less for broad participation in its reinterpretation. Id. Compare
notes 108-16 and accompanying text.
6. Compare Cornel West, Learning to Talk About Race, NY Times Magazine 24 (Aug 2, 1992).
7. Francis Canavan, The Pluralist Game, 44 L & Contemp Probs 23 (Spring 1981) ("Pluralist
Game"), quoting Roberto Unger, Knowledge and Politics 26 (Free Press, 1975).
8. Canavan, Pluralist Game at 34 (cited in note 7).
9. For an excellent introduction to the interrelationship between prestructuralist, structuralist,
and poststructuralist thought, see Peter Dews, Logics of Disintegration (Verso, 1987); see also Hubert L.
Dreyfus & Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics (U Chicago Press,
1983).
10. Examples of metanarrative include the Enlightenment faith in reason, the Hegelian notion
of the dialectic, and Marxist dogma of class struggle yielding a workers' utopia. See Jean-Francois
Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge 37-41, 51, 60 (U Minn Press, 1984). As
Nancy Fraser and Linda Nicholson point out, Lyotard rejects only the "meta" aspect of
metanarrative, granting the need for interpretive frameworks but rejecting claims to stable,
transcendent, or objective viewpoints. Nancy Fraser & Linda Nicholson, Social Criticism without
Philosophy: An Encounter between Postmodernism and Feminism, in Andrew Ross, ed, Universal Abandon ?:
The Politics of Postmodernism 83, 86-90 (U Minn Press, 1988). Peter Dews suggests that in The
Postmodern Condition, Lyotard already retreats from some of his earlier, more radical epistemological
claims, pointing continental philosophy toward renewed reliance on Kant. Dews, Logics of
Disintegration xvii (cited in note 9). For feminist discussions of postmodernism and its political
implications, see Linda J. Nicholson, ed, Feminism/Postmodernism (Routledge, 1990).
Page 159: Summer 19921
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
shatters presumptions of a self-transparent ego and its independent genera-
tion of desire. I I
Yet evidently modern/postmodern disintegration has intensified to an
intolerable extent. During the past decade, reintegration has become a domi-
nant motif. For example, Roberto Unger, the "young professor" whom
Canavan quoted, has since engaged in a reconstructive project, proposing a
unified conception of human nature; he attempts to define "our shared iden-
tity as people."'12 And in Seyla Benhabib's feminist analysis of John Rawls'
social contract theory, the dispute lies between interpretations of the subject
as either an Hobbesist, isolated entity or, conversely, as a product of commu-
nity, and embedded in relationship.' 3 Contextualized by such "disintegra-
tionist" and "integrationist" movements, this essay continues to wrestle with
the tensions inherent in the need for theories of justice to account for, and
nurture, both solitude and solidarity, both freedom and equality.
I
UNVEILING THE SUBJECT: Two FEMINIST CRITIQUES OF RAWLS'
ORIGINAL POSITION
A comprehensive survey of these modern-postmodern "disintegrationist"-
"integrationist" movements is beyond the scope of this work. In another
paper,' 4 I have narrowed the focus, examining closely the critiques of John
Rawls' social contract theory presented by Seyla Benhabib and Susan Moller
Okin. That focus is appropriate for two reasons. First, Rawls' A Theory of
Justice15 is widely recognized as the most brilliant recent contribution to
liberalism's social contract theory. Second, Benhabib and Okin are exemplary
for my purposes in that each addresses, from a feminist perspective, Rawls'
premises regarding the nature of subjectivity. Here I summarize my
understanding of Benhabib's and Okin's arguments in order to clarify the
context within which I turn to covenant as a resource for reconstructing
working definitions of subjectivity.
Rawls' famous original position is a hypothetical construct that erases
participants' knowledge of the particularities of their lives. Behind the "veil
of ignorance," social rank, physical attributes, idiosyncratic desires, goals and
other "special psychological propensities" disappear.16 The original position
also posits universal instrumental rationality, and disinterest in others'
interests.' 7 Parties in this position are predicted to generate two distributive
11. See, for example, Luce Irigaray, Speculum of the Other Woman (Cornell U Press, 1985) (Gillian
Gill, trans).
12. Roberto Mangabeira Unger, Passion 3 (Free Press, 1984).
13. Seyla Benhabib, The Generalized and the Concrete Other, in Eva Feder Kittay & Diana T. Meyers,
eds, Women and Moral Theory 154 (Rowman & Littlefield, 1987).
14. Janet Moore, Unveiling the Subject: Benhabib and Okin on Rawls' Original Position (manuscript
submitted for publication).
15. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Harvard U Press, 1971).
16. Id at 12.
17. Id at 13-14.
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principles, which, taken together, define justice as fairness. First, the parties
will guarantee themselves maximum liberty consistent with the liberty of all
others. Second, they will define just or fair material inequalities as those
which benefit all, and especially the worst-off, in the society.' 8
In an essay strongly informed by Carol Gilligan's work on the psychology
of moral development,' 9 Benhabib argues that John Rawls hamstrings the
emancipatory potential of A Theory of Justice by adhering to a set of
dichotomies that effectively erase women from the moral sphere. She traces
these dichotomies to Thomas Hobbes, but views them as generally
characteristic of classical liberalism and its social contract theories. This set of
hierarchically ordered oppositions separates deontology (addressing law,
right, or justice) from teleology (addressing ultimate goals and meanings, or
the good); public from private; reason from feeling; ethics of right from ethics
of care; masculine from feminine; and, finally, conceptions of the subject as
either generalized (abstracted from all particularities, including relationships)
or concrete (fully embodied, complex, and historical).
Benhabib tightly links Hobbes and Rawls, placing them respectively at the
alpha and omega points in the development of social contract theory. 20 She
also associates the two transitively. Arguing that Rawls shares with
psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg Hobbesist biases toward deontology2 l and
18. Id at 14-15. The second principle is nicknamed "the difference principle."
19. The springboard for Benhabib's discussion is the debate between psychologists Laurence
Kohlberg and Carol Gilligan. Benhabib's view of the connection between Rawls and Kohlberg is
described in the text accompanying notes 21-22. For Rawls' own exposition, see Rawls, A Theory of
Justice at 453-96, especially §§ 70-72 and nn 6 & 8 (cited in note 15). Gilligan contrasts Kohlberg's
"ethics of rights" with her own "ethics of care." In Iris Young's summary,
[tihe "ethic of rights" that Gilligan takes to be typical of masculine thinking emphasizes the
separation of selves and the sense of fair play necessary to mediate the competition among
such separated selves. The "ethic of care," on the other hand, which she takes to be typical
of feminine thinking, emphasizes relatedness among persons and is an ethic of sympathy
and affective attention to particular needs, rather than formal measuring of each according
to universal rules. This ethic of care expresses the relatedness of the ideal of community as
opposed to the atomistic formalism of liberal individualism.
Iris Marion Young, The Ideal of Community and the Politics of Difference, in Nicholson, ed,
Feminism/Postmodernism 300, 306 (cited in note 10).
20. Benhabib, The Generalized and the Concrete Other at 158 (cited in note 13). For a similar
treatment of Hobbes as the font of inevitably individualistic social contract theories, see Jean
Hampton, Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition 1, 11 & § 9.2 (Cambridge U Press, 1986) ("hoping to
shed light on the general structure of all social contract arguments by analyzing and explaining
Hobbes's contractarian argument" and concluding that social contract theories must presuppose "at
least a moderate individualism"). See also Thomas Nagel, Rawls on Justice, in Norman Daniels, ed,
Reading Rawls 1, 9 (Stanford U Press, 1989) (Rawls' "model contains a strong individualistic bias,
which is further strengthened by the motivational assumptions of mutual disinterest and absence of
envy").
21. Benhabib also links deontology with instrumental reason in the following manner: Because
the good is subjectively chosen, reason serves a purely instrumental function; it carves a path toward
the good, but cannot serve to justify any particular end. For a discussion of the distinctions between
understandings of valuation as incommensurable, relative, or subjective, see, for example, Stephen
Gardbaum, Why the Liberal State Can Promote Moral Ideah After All, 104 Harv L Rev 1350, 1355-61
(1991); compare Seyla Benhabib, Afterword: Communicative Ethics and Current Controversies in Practical
Philosophy, in Seyla Benhabib & Fred Dallmayr, eds, The Communicative Ethics Controversy 355-56 (MIT
Press, 1990) (distinguishing ethical rationalism, ethical coguitivism, ethical decisionism, and ethical
emotivism, each of which increasingly limits the possibility of rational justification of value).
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radical individualism, 22 Benhabib claims that these biases dominate
contemporary moral theory and prohibit full attentiveness to the complexity
of the concrete other. In Benhabib's view, then, Rawls' abstraction entails real
loss, as these veiled subjects "cannot be individuated. If all that belongs to
them as embodied, affective, suffering creatures, their memory and history,
their ties and relations to others, are to be subsumed under the phenomenal
realm, then what we are left with is an empty mask that is everyone and no
one."
23
I contend that Benhabib errs in tarring Rawls with the brush of Hobbesist
individualism. Her reading discounts the broader context within which Rawls
places his subjects, which is first and foremost a social order.24 Her error
results from an insufficiently critical reliance on the dichotomies described
above. I concur with Susan Moller Okin that more nuanced and useful
theories of justice require deconstruction of these oppositions.2 5 Although
she agrees with Benhabib that the original position fails to account for gender
22. This view of subjectivity is best captured in Hobbes' admonition to "consider men ... like
mushrooms, come to full maturity, without all kind of engagement to each other." Benhabib, The
Generalized and the Concrete Other at 161 (cited in note 13), quoting Thomas Hobbes, Philosophical
Rudiments Concerning Government and Society, in W. Molesworth, ed, 2 The English Works of Thomas Hobbes
109 (Alders Foreign Books, 1966).
It is important to clarify the truly radical nature of Hobbes' individualism. Jean Hampton neatly
articulates this prevailing interpretation of the Hobbesist subject as social because human, not
human because social. Relationships are purely instrumental and artificially contrived "contracts
between an inferior.., and a superior.. . the latter providing protection for the former in exchange
for obedience." Hobbes' bleak view extends even to the family, a move initially considered quite
mad: "[Hobbes] might as well tell us in plain termes, that all the obligation which a child hath to his
parent, is because he did not take him by the heeles and knock out his braines against the walls, so
soon as he was born." Hampton, Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition 10 (cited in note 20) (quoting
Bishop Bramhall); see also George Shulman, Hobbes, Puritans, and Promethean Politics, 16 Pol Theory
426, 429 (1988) (in Hobbes' state of nature, "[slince there are no known fathers, the children
(usually described as male) are totally in the power of mothers, who are described as indifferent,
malevolent, or incapable of nourishing... those subject to mother love are likely to be 'invaded and
killed by marauders,' or 'alienated,' 'sacrificed,' 'pawned,' or 'sold' by mothers.").
23. Benhabib, The Generalized and the Concrete Other at 166 (cited in note 13).
24. See, for example, Rawls, A Theory ofJustice 3 (cited in note 15) ("Ulustice is the first virtue of
social institutions"); id at 525 n4 ("social union" requires "affection and friendship .... Only in a
social union is the individual complete.").
25. Susan Moller Okin, Reason and Feeling in Thinking About Justice, 99 Ethics 229 (1989). The
deconstructive method approaches singularity anticipating an underlying tension between that one
and the not-one it simultaneously posits and submerges. Conversely, the method approaches
oppositions expecting to "demonstrate the complicity of what the oppositional structure sought to
keep apart." Samuel Weber, Deconstruction Before the Name, 13 Cardozo L Rev 1181, 1183 (1991). See
also Anthony E. Cook, Beyond Critical Legal Studies: The Reconstructive Theology of Dr. Martin Luther King,
Jr., 103 Harv L Rev 985, 986-87 n5 (1990) (describing deconstruction in legal scholarship).
While Okin's deconstructive method is fruitful, she misinterprets Benhabib as "rejecting the
goal[] of... universalizability." See Okin, 99 Ethics at 248 n36 (cited in this note). In fact, Benhabib
is committed to a modified universalizability, which she describes as "interactive" as opposed to
Rawls' "substitutional" type. Benhabib, The Generalized and the Concrete Other at 158 (cited in note 13).
Her express invocation of Habermas' communicative ethics also strongly implicates Enlightenment
values. See id at 168-71 and see generally Afterword (cited in note 21).
Benhabib's critique of Rawls may be problematized by her own commitment to universalist ethics.
On challenging universalization and underlying notions of difference and equality, see, for example,
Martha Minow, Making All the Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion, and American Law (Cornell U Press, 1990);
Young, Politics of Difference (cited in note 19). For a more detailed discussion of Benhabib's interactive
universalism in comparison with several other feminist approaches including Okin's, see Part IIIC.
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as a relevant moral category, 26 Okin argues that A Theory of Justice is
misconstrued as merely an instance of rational choice theory, which narrowly
defines reason as a means to maximize individual self-interest. In fact, she
claims, such rational choice cannot occur behind the veil. This is so, in her
view, because Rawls erases two conditions necessary for pure rational choice:
the contractors' knowledge of their own risk-aversity and their capacity to
weigh probabilities. Rather than exemplifying rational choice theory, the veil
of ignorance and the contractors' mutual disinterest together "achieve[] the
same purpose as benevolence. For this combination of conditions forces each person
in the original position to take the good of others into account."27 This claim is proved
up by the generation of the difference principle, which requires contractors to
adopt the subject-position of "the least advantaged representative man" in
order to determine fair distributive rules.2 8
Contrary to Benhabib, Okin argues that the original position does not lift
contractors from concrete complexity to vacuous generality. Or it does so
only as a byway to re-immersion in the concrete. That is, the original position
assumes contractor omniscience as to the essential characteristics of all
possible subject-positions. Forced to "make others Condicions [their] owne,"
the contractors "cannot think from the position of nobody ... ; they must think
from the position of everybody, in the sense of each in turn." 29
Okin's thesis poses epistemological problems that threaten the essence of
Rawls' theory-its universality. Insofar as knowledge of the other is general,
it cannot engender substantial empathy and rebut the feminist critique.
Insofar as knowledge of the other is concrete, it cannot encompass innumerable
concrete others30 and therefore fails to supply Rawls his requisite universality.
I conclude, therefore, that neither Benhabib nor Okin successfully contends
26. Okin, 99 Ethics at 229 (cited in note 25). Okin claims, as do Benhabib and other feminist
theorists, that the original position "makes the family opaque to claims of justice." See Deirdre
English,Justice Between Generations, 21 Phil Studies 95 (1977), cited in Susan Moller Okin,Justice and
Gender, 16 Phil & Pub Affairs 42, 49 n23 (1987); Susan Moller Okin, Justice, Gender, and the Family
(Basic Books, 1989); see also Benhabib, The Generalized and the Concrete Other at 160, 162-63 (cited in
note 13); Taina Bien-Aime, The Woman Behind the Blindfold: Toward a Feminist Reconstruction of Rawls'
Theory of Justice, 18 Rev L & Soc Change 1125 (1990-91).
The ease and elegance with which these critics incorporate gender as a relevant category for
consideration within the original position undercuts their claims that Rawls' failure here is structural.
Okin, for example, concludes that her neo-Rawlsian contractors would define a just world as
ungendered. Justice as fairness would then entail comprehensive child care, equal entitlement to pay
for wage-workers and domestic workers, and the right to parental leave. Thus Okin significantly
alters Rawls' thoroughly unrepresentative "representative man." While Ben-Aime is far more
attentive than Okin to the subsumption of distinctive subject-positions under a purported "women's
standpoint," her own assessment of Rawls' theory is badly weakened by its uncritical reliance on
Carol Pateman's totalizing arguments in The Sexual Contract (Stanford U Press, 1988). Contrast
Okin's review of Pateman's work in Susan Moller Okin, Feminism, the Individual, and Contract Theory,
100 Ethics 658 (1989).
27. Okin, 99 Ethics at 243 (cited in note 25), citing Rawls, A Theory ofJustice at 148 (cited in note
15) (emphasis added by Okin).
28. Okin, 99 Ethics at 245 (cited in note 25), citing Rawls, A Theory ofJustice at 151 (cited in note
15).
29. Okin, 99 Ethics at 244 (cited in note 25).
30. Unless, perhaps, Okin replaces the hypothetical human contractors with the process God
described in Charles Hartshorne, The Divine Relativity: A Social Conception of God (Yale U Press, 1976).
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with oppositions between reason and feeling, between generality and
particularity, and between individualism and relationship.
By casting her own views on subjectivity as non-Hobbesist, Benhabib
focuses attention on the related, but not identical, opposition between the
radically individuated man-as-mushroom and the intersubjectively
constructed communitarian. Yet both Benhabib and Okin tend to subsume
explicit analysis of the individualist/relationist dichotomy under their
respective discussions of whether subjectivity is best construed as generalized
or concrete, or as dominated by reason or feeling. For Benhabib,
relationships are but one aspect (albeit a definitional aspect) of the concrete
other's particularity. For Okin, relationships are the context within which
reason and feeling cooperate.
But in clarifying the nature of subjectivity, the opposition between
individualists and relationists is distinctive, and deserves careful
consideration. Stephen Gardbaum, for example, describes the dispute as the
"agency debate" and views it as one of three major fronts in the advance of
communitarian theories. 3 1 Part II tackles the dichotomy head-on. Seeking
more nuanced explanations of subjectivity for the purposes of feminist
analysis, I explore the history of the covenant paradigm as it has appeared in
Judaism, Puritanism, and U.S. constitutionalism, testing its utility as a tool for
reconstructing a subject torn between solitude and solidarity. Unlike
Gardbaum, however, I view the three fronts of developing communitarian
theories as readily interconnected. That is, claims about the nature of
subjectivity have implications for metaethics and for the generation of first-
order value claims. 32 Thus, I also attempt in Part II to shake out the
emancipatory elements of the covenant tradition. This task is necessary to
clarify, in Part III, the optimal consequences that covenant-based
interpretations of subjectivity may have for theories of justice and their
practical applications. I conclude that covenant retains liberating potential,
useful for those seeking to wrest from patterns of exclusion and domination
the conditions necessary for "the collective activity of justice[, which] is the
preeminent form of human flourishing." 33
II
COVENANT AS A RECONSTRUCTIVE TOOL
As discussed in Part I, Benhabib identifies two camps in the debate over
the nature of subjectivity. She firmly plants a Hobbesist banner over one
camp, signifying a commitment to drastic individualism. This faction
perceives the subject as "mushroom," abstracted from all particularities and
relationships. The troops appear exclusively male. Of their Genesis, they say
"in the beginning man was alone." 34
31. Gardbaum, 90 Mich L Rev at 701-02 (cited in note 4).
32. See notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
33. Rawls, A Theory of Justice at 529 (cited in note 15).
34. Benhabib, The Generalized and the Concrete Other at 161 (cited in note 13).
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The second camp bears no single, readily identifiable banner, although
among the multiple insignia Carol Gilligan's flies highest. This faction
perceives the subject as embedded in, and constituted by, its relationships.
The troops here appear predominantly female (although fellow travelers like
Michael Sandel huddle around the fire). In the beginning, for them, is the
"nurturance .. .and bonding" of the "mother, . . . sister .... [and] wife." 3 5
Benhabib herself points to a via media between these opposing camps.
That path begins with her admittedly "brief historical genealogy of social
contract theories." 3 6  In one sentence, she not only names Hobbes as
progenitor of modern social contract theory (thus, as discussed in Part I,
implicitly tainting all who follow), but also describes Hobbes' milieu as post-
Aristotelian and post-Christian.3 7 The latter characterization is mistaken, and
can be corrected by recalling Hobbes' reliance on covenant imagery in his
construction of social contract theory.
Far from being post-Christian, late seventeenth-century England was
marked by remarkably ferocious battles over the appropriate relationship
between religion and politics. Intellectuals had far more than passing interest
in Biblical theology. Covenant theology and eschatology were especially chic.
It is thus unsurprising that Hobbes focused intensely on the meaning and
history of covenant in Books II and III of Leviathan. In this respect, his work
appears the "most radical formulation" of divine and civil sovereignty marked
by "subtle interrelationship between religious and political discourse on God
and the state." 38
As discussed below, covenant embodies the creation of mutual
commitment as people come together in a relationship, which becomes
constitutive of their identities and so inherently valuable. This is in
counterpoint to the Hobbesist image of subjectivity within the social contract,
in which the relationship between isolated individuals is merely incidental, a
means to the end of maximizing self-interest through exchange. Covenant
also provides for a more substantive view of individuation and relationship
within subjectivity than that heretofore offered by the feminist-relationist
35. Id at 162-63.
36. Id at 160.
37. Benhabib characterizes Hobbes' time as marked by the "dissolution of the Aristotelian-
Christian world view." Id at 159. The hyphen is ambiguous. She may mean to modify "Christian"
with "Aristotelian," limiting the dissolution to the influence of Thomist Catholicism (although even
so, "dissolution" seems too strong a description). Her discussion of the decline of teleology and the
rise of modernity, culminating "in a disenchanted universe," could support such a reading. She also
recognizes that the privatization distinctive to modernity was initially sought by social contract
theorists to serve religious liberty, extending thereafter to the secular realm. This recognition
implicitly limits the "dissolution" to medieval Catholicism in the wake of the Reformation.
On the other hand, Benhabib may intend the hyphen to perform a more sweeping relegation of
Aristotelianism and Christianity, as two distinct ideologies, to the ashpits of history. This reading is
supported by the broad terms in which she sketches the disenchantment of the universe, implying a
thoroughgoing secularization. It is weakened by her use of the singular noun.
38. David Nicholls, Images of God and the State: Political Analogy and Religious Discourse, 42 Theol
Studies 195, 196, 201 (1981). Elsewhere I explore in more detail covenant's role in Hobbes'
Leviathan. See Janet Moore, Covenant and Subjectivity in Hobbes' Leviathan (manuscript submitted for
publication).
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camp. In their (perhaps justifiable) preoccupation with defining subjectivity
primarily as non-Hobbesist, these critics have left their own constructions
vague. As a consequence, we see subjectivity dissolving into relationship. As
between the individualist and relationist camps, covenant affords a substantive
conception of the subject as both "individual-in-community" 3 9 and, more
profoundly, as "community-in-individual."
Clearly, covenant cannot be relied upon uncritically in reconstructing
working definitions of subjectivity. While I anticipate and address some
possible reactions to covenant-based theories of subjectivity in Part III, two
concerns deserve earlier discussion. The first concern is whether covenant is
inherently exclusive or parochial: Must covenant create the infidel?
Historically, chosenness leaves someone out. Gentiles, unredeemed sinners,
women, blacks, and the unpropertied have been, and to varying degrees
continue to be locked out of the obligations and benefits of these, perhaps the
deepest of promissory relationships. That exclusivity, and the insider's self-
righteousness, can be deadly. The manifest destiny of America's "chosen
people" was bought, for example, with the dislocation and genocide of the
Native American. The Palestinian is exiled from Zion; the practicing
homosexual and lesbian are banned from the church; the urban poor are
quarantined in ghettos. It seems that covenant, in the very act of constituting
members, ostracizes outsiders.
Yet covenant is not unitary; it is not sui generis, nor is its meaning frozen. It
is historical, emerging in a context of philosophical, theological, and political
ethics that celebrate universal human dignity. Thus, covenant is not inherently
parochial. A covenant is defined not by the number of its members, nor even
by the substance of their mutual promise, but by the transforming nature of
membership. Consequently, just as covenant can help to redefine subjectivity,
encompassing both individuality and relationship, so too can covenant retain
its paradigmatic power while simultaneously grounding a politics of inclusion.
For example, under the right conditions, a document such as the United
Nations Declaration of Human Rights40 could obtain covenant stature.
The second concern is that covenant seems repressive. A major attraction
of the Hobbesist social contract lies in its pure instrumentality, its
mythopoetic creation by equals needing one another only to refrain from
interfering with the independent pursuit of subjectively chosen projects.
Covenant, in contrast, is literally more than is bargained for. Covenant
creates individual-in-community and, as that relationship becomes
constitutive of subjective identity, community-in-individual.
39. See John Spencer, Meland's Alternative in Ethics, 6 Process Studies 153 (1976). Space
constraints forbid discussion of the process philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead and his
successors, to which my thinking here is heavily indebted. See, for example, Alfred North
Whitehead, Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology (Free Press, 1978) (David Ray Griffin and Donald
W. Sherburne, eds); Modes of Thought (Free Press, 1966); and Adventures of Ideas (Free Press, 1961).
40. United Nations, International Declaration of Human Rights, in Dusan J. Djonovich, ed, 2 United
Nations Resolutions 135-41 (Oceana Publications, 1973).
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This intersubjective constitution of the self draws fire from all points along
the political spectrum. Classical liberals resist the adulteration of pure
individualism, and any weakening in its guarantee of privatized value.
Moderate liberals bemoan the loss of critical distance, assuming that elements
of personal identity are immune from self-reflection. 4' Leftists worry that
enforced unity suppresses diversity.42 Fundamentally, the shared concern is
that community compromises autonomy.43
These apprehensions are significant, and will be addressed in more detail
in Part III. Yet to reject covenant at the outset on the grounds that
intersubjectivity constrains liberty is to kill just one of a virtual army of
messengers, all of whom bear similar tidings. Covenant clearly signifies the
social construction of identity (although its message is both complex-that is,
irreducible to one theme-and distinctive). So, too, with literary and
linguistic, psychoanalytic and sociological, structuralist and poststructuralist,
postmodern, feminist, and other critical theories, each of which is uniquely
shaped by its disciplinary context.
Two points are noteworthy here. First, to clarify the intersubjective
constitution of personality is not to invent, but simply to reveal "always
already" effective limitations on liberty. For example, this Part's substantive
discussion of covenant traditions points to paradigmatic inequalities between
covenant partners. These inequalities, and the inevitable restrictions (or
reinterpretations) of freedom they entail, are built into the historical genesis
of social arrangements. 44  The myth of the social contract, with its
hypothetical presupposition of equal parties, obscures those inequalities and
silences any voices that might protest what is in fact a contract of adhesion.
The covenant model makes plain that we are born into limited freedom
because we are born into particularity.
The second point flows from the first. We are born into limited freedom.
Antiobjectivism and antiatomism do not necessarily entail antihumanism; they
entail the contextualization, not the erasure, of rationality and liberty.
Recognizing the intersubjective constitution of personality does not leave us
"with nothingness," but instead liberates "our affirmative ability to speak
about human things in a human voice." 45 Granting that this "human voice"
must in fact be plural, Steven Winter points to the crucial role imagination
plays in self-reflection, which is critical to the exercise of freedom:
41. See, for example, Stephen Macedo, Liberal Virtues 244 (Clarendon Press, 1990) ("Allegiances
strongly 'constitutive' of personal identity are placed entirely beyond the reach of critical
reflection.").
42. See, for example, Young, Politics of Diference (cited in note 19).
43. But see Paul W. Kahn, Community in Contemporary Constitutional Theory, 99 Yale L J 1, 84-85
(1989) (expressing the opposite concern that discursive community, which "exists only in the
present," is irreconcilable with law, which "represents authority . . . [for which] discourse has
stopped").
44. I am grateful to Garrett Epps for clarifying this point.
45. Drucilla Cornell, Toward a Modern/Postmodern Reconstruction of Ethics, 133 U Penn L Rev 291,
378 (1986).
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One final point about situatedness. What is situated is an embodied human with a
cognitive capacity. What humans are situated "in" is not some reified entity that looks
like a box or container. Rather, we are situated in a real physical and social
environment that is always in flux and always contingent. We constantly use our
imaginative capacities to recast what we find and reconstruct our context in a variety of
ways.4
6
Thus, covenant is not inherently repressive because covenant is like any
context fluid, not static. To the contrary, covenant demands that members
continually exercise their capacities to maintain, to reinterpret, or to shatter
their bonds-to keep covenant, to change it, or to break it.
This section follows the covenant paradigm as it has appeared in the
Jewish, Puritan, and U.S. constitutional traditions. This introductory material
should help to acquaint the unfamiliar-including the theologically illiterate
who could locate Hobbes in anything approaching a post-Christian milieu-
with the depth and complexity of the covenant paradigm. As described in the
sections below, covenant bears significant reconstructive potential for
interpretations of subjectivity within theories of justice. Feminists and other
critical theorists should attend particularly to extracting the paradigm's
emancipatory focus on equality and the common good. More specifically,
covenant offers possibilities for recontextualizing, and thus redefining, self-
actualization through decisionmaking and action. For example, covenant
strongly implies a theology of participation through work. 47 Spelled out
clearly, covenant-informed theories may justify, in a new and compelling way,
the urgency of affording meaningful opportunities for such participation in
and for the relevant community. Thus, covenant may bring back to earth-
back to the violence, despair, and regeneration of South Central Los
Angeles-those theoretical battles over the meaning of subjectivity described
above.
A. The Judaic Covenant Tradition
Jon Levenson argues impatiently against the tendency of Jewish and
Christian Biblical scholarship after the 1950s to adopt uncritically Martin
Buber's existentialist covenant theology. He objects that while focussing on
covenant, or berith, "theologians spoke stirringly about 'dialogue' and
'relationship' " but were inattentive to halakhah, the normative demands of
46. Steven L. Winter, Bull Durham and the Uses of Theory, 42 Stanford L Rev 639, 664 (1990).
47. See generally Dorothy Slle, To Work and to Love: A Theology of Creation (Fortress Press, 1984);
see also Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Life Together 94 (Harper, 1954) ("A community which allows
unemployed members to exist within it will perish because of them. It will be well, therefore, if every
member receives a definite task to perform... that this person will know in hours of doubt that he or
she, too, is not useless and unusable.").
Seyla Benhabib concludes that to reject the objectivist philosophy of the subject, characteristic
through Hegel and Marx, in favor of an intersubjectivist communicative ethics, entails a rejection of
work as an organizing metaphor for human activity in favor of dialogue or argumentation. Against
this wholesale rejection, I argue that covenant provides for an emancipatory, hence neither
objectivist nor totalizing, reinterpretation of work consistent with presuppositions of
intersubjectivity. Contrast Seyla Benhabib, Critique, Norm, and Utopia: A Study of the Foundations of
Critical Theory 133-43 (Columbia U Press, 1986).
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divine law. 48 To Levenson, this grafting of existentialism onto Judaism was
doomed to bear little fruit, for the resulting "covenant theology ... did not
lead its audience into the texts that are the lifeblood of Jewish existence." 49
Yet Levenson does not abandon Jewish covenental theology. Indeed, he
could not, for covenant is, if not the, at least a central organizing image of
Judaism. Berith punctuates the Hebrew scriptures. Drawing upon these
abundant textual examples, one scholar concludes that covenant is
a general obligation between two parties confirmed either by an oath, a solemn meal, a
sacrifice, or by some other dramatic act .... In the Bible covenants are established
between individuals, between states or their representatives, between kings and their
subjects, and also between husbands and wives .... A covenant can be entered into
either by equal partners sharing mutual obligations and benefits, or by unequal
partners in which the power and authority is asymmetrical as are the responsibilities,
obligations and rewards .... Of all the covenants in the Bible the central one is that
between God and Israel. 50
The symbols or tokens of the latter covenant vary. "The Sabbath is the sign
of Creation; the rainbow is the sign of the renewal of mankind after the Flood;
and the circumcision of the beginning of the Jewish people and the Hebrew
nation." 5 1
Israel's covenant with God spans many stages and falls roughly into two
categories or forms, each traced through its structural similarities to a
particular form of political treaty in the ancient Near East.5 2 It is precisely this
translation of a political bond between states into a theological bond between
God and his chosen people that Levenson finds "one of the revolutionary
developments in human history, one that reverberates continuously
throughout Jewish experience."53
God's covenants with Abraham and David exhibit the first,
"conditionless," 54 "promissory, " 55 or "grant" 56 form. They are fashioned
after royal gift treaties, in which the suzerain, or stronger king, rewards a loyal
vassal, who is a lesser ruler. The gift-usually of land-is accompanied by the
48. Jon Levenson, Covenant and Commandment, 21 Tradition 42, 43 (1983).
49. Id.
50. Steven T. Katz,Jewish Ideas and Concepts 156 (Keter Books, 1977).
51. Id.
52. Id at 157-62; Levenson, 21 Tradition at 46, 49-50 (cited in note 48); Jak6b Jocz, The
Covenant: A Theology of Human Destiny 22 (Eerdmans, 1968); Norman L. Grover, Contracts, Covenants,
and Creative Interchange, in John A. Broyer & William S. Minor, eds, Creative Interchange 291, 293-295
(Southern Ill U Press, 1982).
53. Levenson, 21 Tradition at 46 (cited in note 48); see also Martin P. Golding, Community,
Covenant, and Reason 12, 17-29 (PhD dissertation, Columbia U, 1959) (stressing Israel's radical
particularity as a community, or corpus mysticum, created in the act of covenant with God, and the
intense reciprocity of the covenant relationship "beautifully expressed in a midrashic homily":
R. Simon b. Yokhai inquired of R. Elazar b. R. Yose: Is it possible that you heard from your
father the interpretation of the verse "The crown with which his mother crowned him"?
(Cant. 3:11). He replied: A king had an only daughter, whom he loved very much, and he
called her "my daughter." And his love enlarged to the extent that he called her "my
sister." And it enlarged further until he called her "my mother." So God greatly loved
Israel.
54. Jocz, The Covenant at 24 (cited in note 52).
55. Katz, Jewish Ideas and Concepts at 159 (cited in note 50).
56. Levenson, 21 Tradition at 49 (cited in note 48).
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suzerain's vow to support the vassal in his rulership over his newly acquired
territory. Nothing is required of the vassal in return. The formulaic curses
accompanying the treaty are "directed not at the vassal, but at those who
would attempt a coup against his and his descendants' regime." 57 The
unconditional nature of this covenant is distinctive. The errant promisee will
be punished, but the covenant itself is irrevocable. 58
In contrast to the "gift"-form covenants with Abraham and David, the
Sinaitic covenant follows the six-part formula of a treaty in which the suzerain
acquires the vassal and his loyalty. Although the covenant as expressed in
Exodus and Deuteronomy does not follow the formula precisely, most of the
elements can be located among the various relevant texts. Levenson finds the
formula most clearly followed in Joshua 24, which reiterates God's covenant
with Israel:
Verse 6 contains the preamble; it identifies the suzerain as "Lord, God of Israel."
There follows a long historical prologue, really a resume of Israel's sacred history...
[next] come the stipulations, what God ... asks from the beneficiaries of his grace.
After the people have sworn to accept the obligations of covenant, we see the
provisions for deposition of the text ..... .Then, "witnesses" to the treaty are
invoked. The last item in the formulary of covenant... [are] the blessings and curses
59
The blessings, of course, shower upon the faithful covenant partner; curses
rain upon the infidel.
The sign of the Sinaitic covenant is the Decalogue. It symbolizes the
universal quality of God's relation with Israel. It manifests the obligations of
the chosen people to witness, through obedience to divine law, to the world
around them. This is the formal condition of loyalty required by the suzerain
to secure his protection of the vassal. In Levenson's words,
What creates Israel is Torah, adherence to the order of things that manifests the
suzerainty of the God of Israel .... Sinai speaks to us of our obligations, of the society
we must become, of the world we must build. Its keynote is choice, the choice of
obedience or faithlessness, of prosperity or adversity, of the Land or exile, of life or
death.60
The distinction between the Sinaitic covenant and the six-part treaty upon
which it is modeled is God's unwillingness to break the covenant, even when
the chosen people turn their backs upon their covenental obligations: "Yet
even then . . . I will not reject them or spurn them so as to destroy them,
annulling my covenant with them: for I the Lord am their God." 6' In this
57. Id at 50.
58. Id; Katz, Jewish Ideas and Concepts at 159 (cited in note 50); Jocz, The Covenant at 24 (cited in
note 52).
59. Levenson, 21 Tradition at 44-46 (cited in note 48).
60. Id at 46.
61. Katz, Jewish Ideas and Concepts at 163-67 (cited in note 50); Jocz, The Covenant at 37 (cited in
note 52); see also James B. Torrance, The Covenant Concept in Scottish Theology and Politics and its Legacy,
34 Scottish J Theol 225, 230 (1978) (Biblical covenants are such that "the indicatives of grace are
always prior to the obligations of law and human obedience ... legalism puts it the other way round.
'If you keep the law, God will love you!' . . . . The covenant has been turned into a contract, and
God's grace made conditional on men's obedience.").
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respect, both the "gift" form and the six-part "treaty" form of covenant are,
finally, unconditional.
Thus far the covenant image may seem inimical to liberalism's twin norms
or ordering principles of equality and liberty. Of what relevance to life in a
constitutional democracy is a paradigm patterned after ancient feudal
hierarchies? And, while God was evidently free to offer torah to any of the
world's peoples, 62 where is the freedom in being chosen by an all-powerful
divine suzerain? In terms of contract law, God's covenant with Israel smacks
of officious intermeddling. Could the chosen people reject the offer? Is the
choice between "obedience or faithlessness.., prosperity or adversity.., the
Land or exile . . . life or death" any choice at all?
On one interpretation, the covenant paradigm reverberates with
the inevitable paradox that derives from faith both in God's sovereignty and man's
freedom .... It is obvious that [this contradiction] ... ultimately leads to the second
contradiction, namely that the covenant is both conditional and unconditional. Seen
from God's side it is the latter; seen from the human side it is the former . . . if
covenant depends upon man's loyalty, then God has chosen the wrong partner.
63
Covenant in this view depends upon hesed, God's unremitting grace.
Covenant, then, is a gift, enabling people to order their lives in right
relationship with God, with one another and with the natural world of which
they are created members. Prophetic and rabbinic writings are blunt in
describing the plague and blessing inherent in the freedom to choose to
maintain the relationship or to reject it.
Here I wish to emphasize the manner in which the covenant relationship
becomes constitutive of the partners' identities.
This is perhaps classically expressed by R. Simeon ben Yohai: "Like as when a man
who brings together two ships, and binds them together with ropes and cords, and
builds a palace upon them; while the ships are lashed together, the palace stands,
when they drift apart, it cannot stand. So only when Israel does God's will is his
heavenly palace secure .... 64
Within the context of this covenental relationship, then, every decision is a
moral decision, an opportunity to renew covenant by performing mitsvot, an
opportunity to be seized or spurned.
B. The Puritan Covenant Tradition
Robin Lovin finds that Biblical scholarship's focus on the rediscovered
formulae of suzerainty treaties, as manifest in covenants of the Hebrew Bible,
obscures covenant theology's historical role of affirming human freedom and
equality. 65 In the Puritan tradition, that freedom was rooted in the individual
62. Lev. 26:44.
63. Jocz, The Covenant 39 (cited in note 52). See also David Novak, Natural Law, Halakhah and the
Covenant, 7 Jewish L Ann 43, 59-62 (1988) (distinguishing God's sovereign freedom of initiating
covenant from the finite human freedom of response, and arguing generally that covenant is
consistent with a modestly defined natural law theory).
64. Jocz, The Covenant at 39 (cited in note 52).
65. Robin Lovin, Equality and Covenant Theology, 2 J L & Rel 241 (1984); see also Ralph Barton
Perry, Puritanism and Democracy 192-97 (Vanguard Press, 1944) ("The deepest bond between
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conversion experience, in which God's saving grace broke the bonds of sin,
liberating the redeemed to do God's will. Equality, too, was concomitant with
salvation, as covenant was manifest in the Incarnation:
If we consider it, it is an exceeding great mercy, when we think with ourselves, he is in
heaven, and we are on earth; he the glorious God, we dust and ashes.., and yet he is
willing to enter into covenant, which implies a kind of equality with us. As when
Jonathan and David made a covenant, though there was a difference (the one was a
king's son) yet notwithstanding, when the covenant of friendship was made, there did
arise a kind of equality between them. 66
Lovin finds in sermons such as this a revolutionary egalitarianism ripe for
translation into social and political reality.6 7
He takes issue, however, with the prevailing interpretation that by 1776
"the political influence of the [Puritan] covenant had been secularized into a
theory of social contract." 68 He seeks to revitalize the concern for the
common good, which was central to the Puritan covenant community, and
which serves to balance the "contractarian notion of 'mutually disinterested'
persons who join forces to further their individual aims more effectively."-69
On Lovin's interpretation, the salvation experience enabled the redeemed
Puritan to expand the focus of concern beyond herself by increasing her
comprehension of the requirements of life in covenant with God. This new
understanding provides what Jonathan Edwards describes as a "more
extensive and comprehensive view [of things] clearly in their whole nature,
and the extent of their connections in the universality of things." 70
The quality and intentionality of this covenant relationship is given voice
in John Winthrop's "A Modell of Christian Charity." He presented this
sermon to the members of the Massachusetts Bay Colony aboard the Arabella
in 1630:
Thus stands the cause betweene God and us. Wee are entered into Covenant with him
for this worke, wee have taken out a Commission, the Lord hath give us leave to draw
our owne Articles .... Now if the Lord shall please to heare us, and bring us in peace
to the place wee desire, then hath bee ratified this Covenant and sealed our
Commission [and] will expect a strickt performance of the Articles contained in it ....
For this end, wee must be knitt together in this worke as one man, wee must entertaine
puritanism and democracy was their common respect for the human individual irrespective of his
place in any ecclesiastical, political, social, economic, or other institution.").
66. John Preston, The New Covenant or the Saint's Portion 331 (London, 1682) (spelling
modernized in Lovin, 2J L & Rel at 251-52 (cited in note 65)).
67. Id.
68. Id at 241-42; see also Richard Niebuhr, The Idea of Covenant and American Democracy, 23
Church History 126, 134 (1954):
Contract always implies limited, covenant unlimited commitment; contract is entered into
for the sake of mutual advantages; covenant implies the presence of a cause to which all
advantages may need to be sacrificed. The tendency of the covenant idea to degenerate into
the limited contract idea is evident in all the later religious and social history.
69. Lovin, 2 J L & Rel at 241 (cited in note 65).
70. Jonathan Edwards, in William K. Frankena, ed, The Nature of True Virtue 2 (U Mich Press,
1960), quoted in Robin Lovin, Covenental Relationships and Political Legitimacy, 60 J Rel 1, 6 (1980).
Compare Benhabib, Afterword at 360-64 (cited in note 21) (discussing the Kantian "enlarged
mentality" and its requirement of dialogic - 'interpretive' and 'narrative' skills"); Okin, 99 Ethics 229
(cited in note 25); and Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 Harv L Rev 829, 880-88
(1990) (discussing "positionality" as a feminist methodology); and see Part IIIC.
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each other in brotherly Affeccion, wee must be willing to abridge our selves of our
superfluities, for the supply of others necessities, wee must uphold a familiar
Commerce together in all meekness, gentleness, patience and liberallity, wee must
delight in each other, make others Condicions our owne, rejoyce together, mourne
together, labour and suffer together, allwayes haveing before our eyes our
Commission and Community in the worke, our Community as members of the same
body .... 71
Here is a resource for a depth of intrinsically valuable relationship that stands
in sharp contrast to the vacuous instrumentality of the social contract
caricatured by Benhabib. Winthrop's sermon reverberates with the normative
pull toward a richer solidarity expressed in Rawls' discussion of the social
union. 72
In sharp contrast to Winthrop's and Lovin's portraits, however, Michael
Walzer presents Puritan covenant communities as wracked with anxiety-
bordering on and breaking into panic-provoked by predestinarianism. In
this view, Puritanism was a "revolutionary ideology," 73 a fanatical response to
the social and political upheavals of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
The concern of the elect to "keepe God's Commandements and his
Ordinance, and his lawes, and the Articles of our Covenant with him"
translated into an unremitting and rigorous examination of self and other.
This was the heart of Puritan self-control. It was exercised to ward off Satan,
whose predatory tactics were abundantly evident in the wilderness seething
about the "Citty upon a Hill," 7 4 and who besieged each soul in its private
pilgrimage.
Walzer seems not to grasp the possibility of an "internal covenant." 75 He
does not imagine that after conversion the predestination doctrine might
engender more humility than anxiety. He focusses instead upon the chill
rigor of the "external covenant," the oft-caricatured "ducking stool and
scarlet letter." Lovin, conversely, may gloss over the grimmer aspects of life
in the Puritan covenant community in his eagerness to lift up the tradition's
beneficial aspects. He is perhaps a bit smug in dismissing concerns, such as
Walzer's, over the repression of autonomous individuality:
We must not in our thinking reduce human community to a mere starting point for
freedom. In the covenental understanding, freedom occurs when the self-
transcending individual imagination actually does transcend the self and strikes a
response in another . . . . If the political community of the covenant never quite
achieves the privacy and individuality of goals that characterizes liberalism, this may be
because persons in covenant are never reduced to the poverty of motives from which
liberal political construction proceeds. 7 6
71. Winthrop, Christian Charity (cited in note 3).
72. See note 24 and accompanying text.
73. Michael Walzer, Puritanism as a Revolutionary Ideology, in Stanley N. Katz & Stanley I. Kutler,
eds, New Perspectives on the American Past 3-36 (Little, Brown, 1969).
74. Winthrop, Christian Charity (cited in note 3).
75. The idea of internal and external covenants originates with Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics
(Harper, 1962). See also Robert N. Bellah, The Broken Covenant: American Civil Religion in a Time of
Trial 142 (Seaburg Press, 1975); Lovin, 60J Rel at 2-3 (cited in note 70).
76. Lovin, 60J Rel at 10 (cited in note 70).
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It is likely that an accurate account of covenant, as experienced in the
context of Puritanism, lies somewhere between Lovin's and Walzer's.
Interestingly, these scholars share a dim view of Weber's thesis that capitalism
has its tap root in Puritanism. 77 Specifically, Walzer supports Lovin's
emphasis on the disparate roots of covenant and contract, since contract
requires notions of individualism, subjective value, trust, and good faith in
bargaining that completely confounded Puritan interpretations of human
nature.
Lovin grants that Puritans necessarily rejected classical liberalism's
anthropology, and "not because it thought we are better than the security-
seeking, desire-driven creatures Hobbes described, but because it thought we
are worse." 78 Nevertheless, within the covenant community itself, Lovin
discerns a source of social and political equality beyond the negative pole of
depravity and the positive pole of redemption. This potential lies in the
theology of work as participation in and for the community:
where in contract theory the similarity of persons in their powers confers equal value
on their projects, in covenant theology the fact that differentiated vocations all
contribute to the common good requires an equal regard for the persons who perform
them .... Entry into the covenant sets aside ordinary criteria of success and failure,
which measure wealth and status against the achievements of other persons generally.
The covenental standard is instead fidelity to my particular task within the
commonwealth, mastery of its skills, enjoyment of its unique satisfactions, and offering
its daily performance to God .... 79
As it appears within Puritanism, then, covenant shares at least two major
characteristics with Judaic notions of covenant. The first, akin to hesed, is a
deep awareness of human dependence on divine grace, the "good not our
own." The second, akin to mitsvot, is the possibility that a freely chosen
relationship can become so constitutive of one's identity as to transform
action from banal to meaningful and even sacral.
C. Covenant in the U.S. Constitutional Tradition
As the colonies grew, the theocentricity of the covenant paradigm faded.
Or, perhaps more accurately, the covenant's boundaries expanded to embrace
a nation. The vastness of New Canaan thwarted the Puritan's solemn
intention to extend theocracy; that liberty which the covenant community had
fully intended to keep for itself was grudgingly granted to neighboring
heretics: Catholics, Quakers, Baptists, Jews.8°
Yet as theocracy faded, it was precisely concern over the classical liberal's
"poverty of motives" that fueled the debate between federalists and
77. Contrast Gardbaum, 90 Mich L Rev at 726 and n153 (cited in note 4) (claiming that "one
can believe that the individual is not the source of the good and also that the good is not necessarily
pursued in common; in fact, this combination is quite familiar for it is a central tenet of
Protestantism"). Gardbaum's claim is contradicted by the centrality of covenant theology within
many branches of Protestantism.
78. Lovin, 2 J L & Rel at 245 (cited in note 65).
79. Id at 253.
80. See Sidney Mead, The Lively Experiment (Harper & Row, 1976).
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antifederalists during the transition from the Articles of Confederation to the
Constitution. In this debate, the Puritan surely stood dismayed between
federalist and antifederalist, going the former one better in his dour
evaluation of the human capacity for virtue, yet sharing the latter's concern
for a common striving toward the public good.8' The federalists sought to
channel the citizen's inevitable self-interest by playing faction against faction
within the confines of a "well-ordered constitution."8 2 Government was to
serve as referee, securing competing private interests from mutual
interference. Because the bond between the states created by the Articles of
Confederation proved too frail for the job, a more robust, centralized power
was required.
Proper constitutional interpretation requires careful attention to the
covenant tradition out of which the final document emerged, stretching the
founding era to encompass the decades between 1765 and 1805. Like Lovin,
Donald Lutz traces an explicit dedication to the common good throughout
this tradition.83 Lutz refutes the thesis that the Founders incorporated a
Hobbesist individualism of the "rugged frontier" variety into their drafting of
the Constitution. Rather, he views their context as thoroughly
communitarian:
the vast majority of Americans were, by the 1770s, safe and secure in a town or
community .... At no time since 1776 has more than 10 percent of the American
population lived on what we know as a frontier. Most of the communities then in
existence, containing most of the people, had been in existence for a century or more.
The frontier was on the other side of the mountains, but life on this side was settled
and sophisticated . . . community allow[ed] its members to provide "their mutual
assistance toward their own perfection.
8 4
Within this context, the antifederalists sought in the classical republican
tradition to disperse power to the most local level practicable, because only in
81. From another perspective, the Federalists held the optimistic, and the anti-federalists the
pessimistic view of human nature. See John D. Lewis, Anti-Federalists vs. Federalists 23-24, 36-38
(Chandler, 1967).
82. Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 Va L Rev
543, 546 (1986), quotingJohn Adams inJohn P. Diggins, The Lost Soul of American Politics: Virtues, Self-
Interest and the Foundations of Liberalism 70-71 (Basic Books, 1984).
83. Donald Lutz, The Origins of American Constitutionalism 25, 27, 28 (La State U Press, 1988)
(citing as exemplary the Mayflower Compact of 1620, which intended to further the community's
"better Ordering and Preservation ... and ... [the framing of] ... just and equal Laws"; a 1630
Boston church covenant, committing the people to live "in mutual love, & respect for each other";
and the Providence Agreement of 1637, promising obedience to "all such orders and agreements as
shall be made for the public good of the body." See also John Witte, How to Govern a City on a Hill:
The Early Puritan Contribution to American Constitutionalism, 39 Emory LJ 41 (1990).
84. Lutz, The Origins of American Constitutionalism at 71-73 (cited in note 83) (citing Agricola
[pseud.], [untitled essay], Massachusetts Spy (Boston, Oct 22, 1772); see also Niebuhr, 23 Church
History at 133 (cited in note 68):
One must not read into the seventeenth century ... the individualism that characterized the
later revival periods .... In the covenant conception the essence of freedom does not lie in
the liberty of choice among goods, but in the ability to commit oneself for the future ... an
in the terrible liberty of being able to become a breaker of the promise, a traitor to the cause
Contrast Grover, Contracts, Covenants, and Creative Interchange at 301 (cited in note 52) (construing the
Constitution as an "external covenant . . . embraced on the basis of mutual self-interest . . .
explicit[ly] [founded on] Hobbesian and Lockean social contract theory").
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an intimate polity could each citizen fulfill his social, political nature through
maximal participation in public affairs. That participation in turn was the
means for "the attainment of virtue, and happiness among ourselves," which
was the purpose of government. 85
Moreover, the antifederalists were keenly concerned with the implications
of concentrated government for a class-based society. In particular, they
feared underrepresentation of the middle class and intensification of
disparities in power and wealth as the Constitution actualized its "Aristocratic
Tendency."'86 The ferocious Centinel vented his anxieties thus: "View this
Collosus attempting to grasp the commerce of America . . . . View his
towering aspect, he would have no bowels of compassion for the oppressed,
he would overlook all their sufferings." 87
Of course, neither federalists nor antifederalists extended their concerns
for liberty and equality universally. The Constitution explicitly excepted
slaves from its protections.88 The status of women was not even deemed
noteworthy until 1868, when their disenfranchisement was enscribed in the
apportionment clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.8 9 As in the Jewish and
Puritan covenant traditions, then, covenant within the U.S. constitutional
tradition reads ambiguously. This covenant signifies a celebration of human
dignity and deliberate exclusion from that celebration; it expresses firm
guarantees of equal liberty and their explicit repression.
In the continuing contest to interpret this text, one siezes with relief upon
W. B. Allen's extended exegesis of Federalist 51. On behalf of the Federalist
case, Allen cites Publius' assertion that "justice is the end of government. It is
the end of civil society. It ever has been and ever will be pursued until it be
obtained, or until liberty be lost in the pursuit." Allen argues that
more impoverished versions of Madisonianism-typically presented as the doctrine of
a multiplicity of interests within an extended republic-fail systematically to express
85. Brutus, January 3, 1788, in The Anti-Federalist 145, 146 (U Chicago Press, 1985) (Herbert J.
Storing, ed; abridgement by Murray Dry). Of course, such fulfillment was restricted to the
landholding male minority. The recent enactment of the 27th Amendment two hundred years after
its approval by Congress could rejuvenate its antifederalist companion, which requires the election of
at least one Representative for every fifty thousand persons. As William Van Alstyne notes, the
House might then have to accommodate at least 5,000 members. William W. Van Alstyne, What Do
You Think About the 27th Amendment?, Duke Law Magazine 13, 14 nl (Summer 1992).
86. Herbert J. Storing, What the Anti-Federalists Were For, in Herbert J. Storing, ed, 1 The Complete
Anti-Federalist 48 (U Chicago Press, 1981); see also Lewis, Anti-Federalists vs. Federalists at 21-23 (cited
in note 81); Ralph Ketcham, ed, The Anti-Federalist Papers and the Constitutional Convention Debates 16-20
(Mentor, 1986). Critiques of the Constitution's failure to attend to substantive equality between
economic classes include, for example, James B. Sterba, The U.S. Constitution: A Fundamentally Flawed
Document, in Christopher B. Grey, ed, Philosophical Reflections on the United States Constitution: A Collection
of Bicentennial Essays 134 (Mellen, 1989); Arthur S. Miller, The Secret Constitution and the Need for
Constitutional Change (Greenwood, 1987).
87. Centinel, Letter VIII (Philadelphia) Independent Gazette in W. B. Allen, Gordon Lloyd &
Margie Lloyd, eds, The Essential Antifederalist 254 (U Press of America, 1985).
88. U.S. Const art I, § 2, cl 3; id § 9, cl 1; id art IV, § 2, cl 3; see also Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19
Haw 393 (1857).
89. U.S. Const amend XIV, § 2, cl 2. The disenfranchisement of women remained in effect
through the enactment of the fifteenth amendment two years later and for a half-century thereafter.
See id amend XIX.
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the correct foundations of Madison's founding principle because they fail to take
seriously Federalist 5 1's invocation ofjustice. The operative analogy throughout is that
justice inheres as fully in the arguments of The Federalist as piety inheres in the Torah,
although neither is frequently mentioned in either.
90
For in place of the covenant centered upon torah, entered at birth and
renewed freely through obedience to halakhah; instead of the covenant
centered upon the incarnation of God in Jesus, entered through conversion;
the covenant of the new nation centered upon the Constitution, to be entered
through the rational recognition of classical liberalism's twin principles of
individual liberty and juridical equality. Thus the covenant paradigm
remained effective as
in the end the Roman archetypes proved less profound and less lasting than the
biblical ones, for Latin culture was more confined to the elite than biblical culture.
The great image for the founding of the nation was Exodus, not Aeneid. Even the
classicist Jefferson proposed a picture of Moses leading Israel across the Red Sea for
the Great Seal of the United States. And in his second inaugural address he said, "I
need, too, the favor of that Being in whose hands we are, who led our forefathers, as
Israel of old, from their native land, and planted them in country flowing with all the
necessaries and comforts of life; who has covered our infancy with his providence, and
our riper years with his wisdom and power.91
Robert Bellah describes America's self-image as a chosen people, and the
various prophets of the new civil religion, who denounced their failures to
keep the covenant. He points to Lincoln's Second Inaugural Address as
"perhaps the greatest expression of the theme of covenant and judgment in
the entire course of American history:"
Fondly do we hope, fervently do we pray, that this mighty scourge of war may speedily
pass away. Yet, if God wills that it continue until all the wealth piled up by the
bondsman's two hundred and fifty years of unrequited toil shall be sunk, and until
every drop of blood drawn with the lash shall be paid by another drawn with the
sword, as was said three thousand years ago, so still it must be said "the judgments of
the Lord are true and righteous altogether."
9 2
The continued vitality of the covenant paradigm, and the interweaving of
sacred imagery and civil religion to subvert oppression, were demonstrated
many decades later by Martin Luther King in his letter to the white clergymen
of Birmingham:
We will reach the goal of freedom in Birmingham and all over the nation, because the
goal of America is freedom. Abused and scorned though we may be, our destiny is
tied up with America's destiny. Before the pilgrims landed at Plymouth we were here.
Before the pen of Jefferson etched the majestic words of the Declaration of
Independence across the pages of history, we were here .... We will win our freedom
because the sacred heritage of our nation and the eternal will of God are embodied in
our echoing demands.
93
90. W. B. Allen, Justice and the General Good: Federalist 51, in Charles R. Kesler, ed, Saving the
Revolution: The Federalist Papers and the American Founding 131, 132 (Free Press, 1987).
91. Bellah, The Broken Covenant at 24-25 (cited in note 75).
92. Id at 53-54.
93. Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from the Birmingham City Jail, reprinted in James M.
Washington, ed, A Testament of Hope: The Essential Writings of Martin Luther King, Jr. 289, 301 (Harper &
Row, 1986). More recently still, Democratic presidential nominee Bill Clinton has urged voters to
create (under his leadership) a "New Covenant." See Karen DeWitt, In Their Own Words, Clinton's
Policy Trademark: "New Covenant, " NY Times A15 col 2 (July 17, 1992). Evangelists Pat Robertson
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This survey of covenant imagery is intended to demonstrate the
paradigm's historically deep roots, as well as its complex and ambiguous
meanings. Charles Davis writes that
[t]radition can be and often has been a Babylonian captivity, because it has served as a
pretext for the imposition and continuance of heteronomous authority. But it is also
the irreplaceable repository of experiences too rich for discursive reason adequately to
objectify and lay hold Of 94
The dimension of covenant I have sought especially to "lay hold of" is the
possibility it presents that a relationship may have such depth and significance
as to become constitutive of subjective identity, and consequently to inform
all aspects of decisionmaking and action with that relationality. Feminists and
other critical theorists may do well to appropriate and mold the deeply rooted
covenant emphases on equality and the common good to energize their
critiques. Particularly when closely bound with concerns for social justice
embodied in liberation theologies 95 or their secular counterparts, covenant
offers a powerful paradigm for transformation of the prevailing order.
III
SOME CRITICISMS AND CONSEQUENCES OF COVENANT-BASED
THINKING
The turn to covenant to shape theories of subjectivity will evoke disparate
responses. The self-consciously secular may dismiss covenant as meaningless,
that is, irrelevant and inaccessible. Part II attempts to meet that challenge,
but undoubtedly the paradigm's distinctive character will ensure that it lacks
universal appeal. 96 Others may grasp covenant's meaning, but reject its
historical ties, for example, to systems of patriarchal domination. For these,
the turn to covenant is likely to appear reactionary. But to reject covenant on
such grounds is to fall prey to the genetic fallacy, to indulge in an ad hominem
attack that surrenders to history (and to the genuinely reactionary) any utility
the paradigm offers today.
Another objection to covenant-informed theories is their limited scope of
applicability. But my claims for covenant are modest. I do not intend to
and Jerry Falwell challenge Clinton's use of covenant imagery. See Ari L. Goldman, Religion Notes,
NY Times § 1, at 9 col 1 (July 25, 1992) (Robertson describing Clinton's speech as "extremely
dangerous . .. pseudo-Christianity").
94. Charles Davis, Theology and Political Society 103 (Cambridge U Press, 1978).
95. See, for example, Jos6 Miguez Bonino, Toward a Christian Political Ethics (Fortress Press,
1983); Mary Daly, Beyond God the Father: Toward a Philosophy of Women's Liberation (Beacon Press, 1985);
Gustavo Gutierrez, A Theology of Liberation (Orbis, 1973); Rosemary Radford Reuther, Sexism and God-
Talk (Beacon Press, 1983); Cornel West, Prophesy Deliverance! An Afro-American Revolutionary Christianity
(Westminster Press, 1982).
96. On the other hand, a peculiar strength of covenant imagery may be its broader accessibility,
beyond the walls of acad6me, relative to an unmodified feminism or a highly abstract discourse-based
ethics (the latter of which occasionally obscures Wittgenstein's observation that "words are deeds").
Ludwig von Wittgenstein, Culture and Value 46e (G. W. Von Wright, ed; Peter Winch, trans) (U
Chicago Press, 1980); see also John R. Searle, Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language 16
(Cambridge U Press, 1949); Lawrence B. Solum, Freedom of Communicative Action: A Theory of the First
Amendment Freedom of Speech, 83 Nw L Rev 54 (1989); compare note 47 and accompanying text.
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follow Unger in trying to sketch some identifiable essence of human nature,9 7
nor to argue that covenant can undergird a grand unified ethical theory.
Rather, I seek to highlight covenant's utility for (plural) reconstructions of
subjectivity within (plural) theories of justice.
I readily concede, then, that not all associations are characterized by
covenant's transforming depth of commitment. Membership in a local gun
club is unlikely to have significance equivalent to marriage (although such
transvaluations certainly occur). Admittedly, no social bond may be
consciously experienced as covenental. Conversely, however, persons can
locate themselves simultaneously within multiple covenants. 98 One's actions
can be informed simultaneously by memberships in a family or household, a
neighborhood, a community of worship, a political association, a nation, and
even a biosphere.99
Yet if covenant could be grounded in various associations, does it lack
distinctive substance? Is membership in the Ku Klux Klan as potentially
covenental as membership in Greenpeace? It seems so, if covenant is reduced
to the single theme "relationship constitutes identity." Yet clearly covenant's
significance is complex. Ruthless abstraction of covenant's implications for
the debate over subjectivity from other essential elements-such as its
emphases on equality and the common good-does violence to the paradigm.
Moreover, I present covenant within the context of a specific, feminist
critique, committed to a vision ofjustice as universal dignity that reveals, and
seeks to revolutionize, patterns of exclusion and domination. Within this
context, I claim that the U.S. Constitution retains paradigmatic covenental-
and emancipatory-potential, and call for renewed dedication to its
realization. And, within this context, KKK members would bear an
insurmountable burden in defining their commitments as covenental.
From still another perspective, covenant may seem redundant in
reconstructing theories of subjectivity. As J. M. Balkin notes, "[t]he social
construction of the individual is so often proclaimed these days that it must by
now seem widely accepted."' 0 0 In this view, covenant might offer little to add
to or distinguish from critiques offered, for example, by structuralists,
poststructuralists, and postmodernists. Balkin points out, however, that few
scholars, particularly in legal theory, take the claim of intersubjectivity
seriously enough to trace out its implications. Moreover, covenant offers a
substantive vision different both from the "anti-humanist effacement of the
subject" consequent to some structuralist and poststructuralist critiques, and
from the "naivete of radical subjectivism" plaguing liberal theory.' 0 1
97. See note 12 and accompanying text.
98. Compare Mari J. Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as Jurisprudential
Method, I I Women's Rights L Rep 7 (1989).
99. See, for example, John B. Cobb, The Liberation of Life: From the Cell to the Community
(Cambridge U Press, 1981).
100. J. M. Balkin, Ideology as Constraint, 43 Stan L Rev 1133 (1991) (review of Andrew Altman,
Critical Legal Studies: A Liberal Critique (Princeton, 1990)).
101. Idat 1168.
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But to flesh out this substantive vision is to confront perhaps the most
compelling criticism of covenant-based constructions of subjectivity: They
may fail to account for, and nurture, solitude. The covenant subject,
conceived simultaneously as individual-in-community and as community-in-
individual, may simply subsume individuality in community. This criticism is
levelled at communitarian approaches generally and hearkens back to
Canavan's assertion, described in the introduction, that the essence of
modernity is the individual's shrugging off the shackles of social expectation.
Those who view this development as not only genuine, but salutary, are
likely to perceive covenant as little more than constraint. For example,
Stephen Macedo worries that a communitarian ethos will compromise one's
"right to lead either a silly or a serious life .... To spend [one's] free time
either watching TV and drinking beer or cultivating 'higher' pleasures."
10 2
Iris Marion Young poses a similar objection from the left wing of the political
spectrum. She asserts that feminist communitarians sacrifice diversity, "the
concrete political vision of inexhaustible heterogeneity," in their desire for
"social wholeness and identification."'' 0 3
Again, I readily concede that the specific implications I draw from
covenant traditions are arguably antiliberal in several respects. First,
covenant makes plain that we are born into contexts that circumscribe our
liberty. This emphasis contrasts with that of Macedo, for example, who clings
to a paradigmatic, but largely discredited, vision of the liberal subject as
independently pursuing freely chosen ends. Psychoanalytic theory calls into
question the image of a centered, self-transparent consciousness capable of
such radical freedom. ' 04 Extensive scholarship in other disciplines reveals the
social construction of desire itself. 10 5 Covenant-based interpretations of
subjectivity cohere better with this contemporary view than with the
unmodified liberalism they oppose.
Moreover, covenant highlights a concern for equality and the common
good, which imposes an ethical restraint on (or clarifies an ethical context for)
one's choices. Although her criticism of Benhabib and other feminists seems
overstated, Young aptly questions for whom the common good is held to be
"common," and cautions against the subsumption of distinctive voices in
revising that definition. Certainly the plurality of good lives from which, for
102. Macedo, Liberal Virtues at 232 (cited in note 41).
103. Young, Politics of Difference at 301-302 (cited in note 19). While Young's concern is apt,
compare notes 25 and 42-47 and accompanying texts, she offers her own totalizing approach,
insisting on an urban model for politics within which residents live "among strangers with whom they
are not in community." Id at 303. Moreover, Young may have built a straw man (or woman) of her
communitarian opponents. She concedes in the end that "it may be a matter of stipulation" whether
the name "community" is given to the polity she promotes. Id at 320. Thus, on comparing Young's
politics of difference with the feminist methodologies discussed in Part IIIC, one might well wonder,
"What's the difference?"
104. See, for example, Irigaray, Speculum (cited in note 11).
105. See, for example, Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality: Volume I/An Introduction (Vintage
Books, 1980), and Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (Vintage, 1979) (Alan Sheridan trans);
Balkin, 43 Stanford L Rev at 1148-49 (cited in note 100); Nancy Fraser, Talking About Needs:
Interpretive Contests as Political Conflicts in Welfare-State Societies, 99 Ethics 291 (1989).
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example, Benhabib's ethical agent may choose-ranging from Mother Teresa
to a Warsaw ghetto resistance fighter-seems not to encompass Macedo's TV-
watching beer-drinker.'0 6 And it seems clear that within a covenant
relationship dedicated to universal human dignity, lifestyles of conspicuous
consumption in the face of global deprivation are not ethically viable.
Covenant creates, or reveals, an ethical context for every decision-from the
rarified level of Imelda Marcos' indulgence in footwear, to the more mundane
choice either to breakfast on Post Toasties or to continue fasting, in order to
fund a donation to Oxfam.
Thus, covenant clearly, and distinctively, signifies the restrictions on
liberty inherent in the social construction of identity. Yet the paradigm also
highlights what Neibuhr called "the terrible freedom" of keeping or breaking
covenant.10 7 Consequently, covenant provides space for the meaningful
exercise of individuality and liberty. In the following section, I explore what
sort of individual freedom can be manifest within covenant and how it may be
exercised. I do so in two ways. First, I contrast the implications of covenant-
based thinking with Stephen Gardbaum's defense of liberalism against various
types of communitarian critique. Second, I compare this covenant-based
appraoch to the methods of several contemporary feminist theorists.
A. Can Liberalism Survive Antiatomism?
In Law, Politics, and the Claims of Community, Stephen Gardbaum responds to
three critiques of liberalism, all of which he subsumes under the label
"communitarian."' 0 8  These critiques focus, first, on the nature of
subjectivity; second, on the method of generating ethical norms; and, third,
on the relative value of substantive norms. Gardbaum claims that there is no
necessary connection between the outcomes in these three separate debates
and, moreover, that liberalism can coexist with "communitarian" outcomes in
all but the last. In other words, Gardbaum's liberalism is threatened not by a
"communitarian" subject, that is, one constituted intersubjectively; nor by the
corporate creation of norms, or "metaethical communitarianism;" but only by
a claim about the priority of a substantive good.
Thus, for Gardbaum's liberalism, the "ominous thunder" of
communitarianism is the claim that life is best lived in community. His thesis
rests on a sharp distinction between the source and content of values.
Liberalism can coexist with socially constructed individuals living with socially
constructed values, so long as these values do not threaten subjective
106. Benhabib concurs with the privatization of value to the extent that
as modems we have to live with varieties of goodness. Whether the good life is to be
fulfilled as an African famine relief fighter, a Warsaw ghetto resistant, a Mother Teresa, or a
Rosa Luxemburg ethical theory cannot prejudge .... I regard neither the plurality and
variety of goodness with which we have to live in a disenchanted universe nor the loss of
certainty in moral theory to be a cause of distress.
Benhabib, Afterword at 350 (cited in note 21).
107. Niebuhr, 23 Church History at 134 (cited in note 68).
108. Gardbaum, 90 Mich L Rev at 685 (cited in note 4).
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preference; they must make no "first order claims about what is valuable."' 0 9
Despite his claims to the contrary, then, Gardbaum confirms Canavan's
argument: liberalism's ultimate meaning lies in the privatization of value, the
untrammeled freedom to select one's own ends. In Pastan's words, "there
seems no way in/or out/and though there is a sea here/there is no tide."
I challenge Gardbaum's claim that interpretations of subjectivity have no
necessary consequences for the generation of substantive political and ethical
values. In contrast, I view the outcome in the antiatomism debate as tightly
linked to the metaethical debate, and both of these, within a feminist-
covenantal context, as having predictable and ambiguously antiliberal
implications. I contend that Gardbaum's thesis depends upon two strategic
errors. First, it understates the significance of the intersubjective construction
of personality. Second, it silences distinctive voices, such as feminist critiques,
among the various forms of critical theory by subsuming them under
communitarianism. Only by diluting the force of antiatomist critiques and
abstracting them from their explicitly political contexts can Gardbaum's
liberalism survive the communitarian challenge unscathed.
Gardbaum's understatement of the assault upon the liberal subject is
evident from the outset, when he defines postmodernism in opposition to
romantic antimodernism and identifies Richard Rorty and Jurgen Habermas
as postmodernism's spokesmen. t0 With these moves, he deflects the fiercest
fire postmodernism aims at the liberal subject, and can confidently conclude
that the antiatomism thesis "means no more and no less than... that, had we
been brought up in a different society from the one we were in fact brought
up in, we would now be different people.""'
Gardbaum begins by reducing postmodernism (a complex, ill-defined
collection of perspectives) to (1) skepticism about human rationality and (2)
antifoundationalism and antiobjectivism." 2 The definition is both over- and
underinclusive. With respect to the first criterion, there is nothing
109. Id at 689.
110. Id at 689, 694.
111. Idat 704.
112. Id at 689. It is only fair to note that even one of the foremost expositors of postmodernity
hesitated to fix it through description "in a moment in which the very conception of historical
periodization has come to seem most problematical indeed." Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism, or the
Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, 146 New Left Rev 53, 55 (1984).
The genealogy of postmodernism points to the arts. As an aesthetic trend in the visual arts
(including architecture and film), literature, and music, postmodernism celebrates the
representation-in-itself: the flattened image or pastiche of surfaces with no explicit reference to any
substance beneath or external significance. Jameson views these disparate expressions as sharing a
common rejection of the hierarchical divide
between high culture and so-called mass or commercial culture .... The postmodernisms
have in fact been fascinated precisely by this whole "degraded" landscape of schlock and
kitsch, of TV series and Readers' Digest culture, of advertising and motels, of the late show
and the grade-B Hollywood film, of so-called paraliterature with its airport paperback
categories of the gothic and the romance, the popular biography, the murder mystery and
science-fiction or fantasy novel ....
Id at 54. Perhaps the purest embodiment of postmodernity is the music video, which dances
gleefully on the grave of the modern distinction between high culture, or performance, and mass
culture, or commodity advertising.
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distinctively postmodern about skepticism;' 13 moreover, as Gardbaum himself
notes, Habermas does not fit this definiens." 4 With respect to the second
criterion, Gardbaum fails to communicate the most radical, antihumanist
challenges to the liberal interpretation of subjectivity posed by the combined
force of the poststructuralist/postmodern/critical theory movements." 5
Most significantly, Gardbaum fails to account for the social construction of
desire, and the decentering of the self-transparent, self-identical subject he
needs to retain liberalism's distinctive privatization of value."16
Gardbaum's second strategic error is the abstraction of antiatomistic
arguments from their distinctively and explicitly political contexts. Feminist
theories, for example, and the oppositional politics they intend to serve, focus
upon the identification and dismantling of gender-based forms of domination.
Other analyses target hierarchies based on race, class, or sexual orientation,
and a growing body of scholarship attends to the complex ways in which these
social structures concatenate." 7 Within the context of oppositional political
commitments, liberalism's sanctification of subjective preference is perceived
frequently and often accurately as a strategy for justifying continued patterns
of exclusion and domination. The re-visions of justice inherent in these
political projects collide headlong with Gardbaum's insistence on
privatization of value. They cannot comfortably coexist.
Despite these problems in his analysis, Gardbaum correctly insists that
participants in one or more of the three types of communitarian critique must
argue for, rather than assume, the implications of the outcome in one debate
for the outcome in another. For example, proponents of the antiatomism
thesis must justify the conclusion that values are produced collectively.
Similarly, participants in either of these debates must independently establish
claims for elevating certain substantive values over others. I address this
challenge in the next section.
113. See, for example, Ecclesiastes 1:17 ("So I applied my mind to understand wisdom and
knowledge, madness and folly, and I came to see that this too is chasing the wind."); Plato, Theatetus
161d, in Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns, eds, Plato: The Collected Dialogues 867 (Pantheon
Books, 1961) (refuting Sophist claims); David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (Book I) §§ 2-3
(Clarendon Press, 2d ed 1978).
114. Gardbaum, 90 Mich L Rev at 685 (cited in note 4) (describing Habermas as "The Guardian
of Rationality").
115. See, for example, Donna Haraway, A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology and Socialist
Feminism in the 1980s, in Nicholson, ed, Feminism/Postmodernism at 190 (cited in note 10); Balkin, 43
Stanford L Rev 1168 (cited in note 100); Fraser & Nicholson, Social Criticism without Philosophy at 87
(cited in note 10) (Lyotard's postmodernism "casts critique as strictly local, ad hoc, and ameliorative,
thus supposing a political diagnosis according to which there are no large-scale, systematic problems
which resist local, ad hoc, ameliorative initiatives.").
116. See notes 104-05.
117. See, for example, Bell Hooks, Feminist Theory from Margin to Center (South End Press, 1984);
Judy Scales-Trenton, Black Women and the Constitution: Finding Our Place, Asserting Our Rights, 24
Harvard CR-CL L Rev 9 (1989);Judith A. Winston, Mirror, Mirror on the Wall: Title VII, Section 1981,
and the Intersection of Race and Gender in the Civil Rights Act of 1990, 79 Cal L Rev 775 (1991).
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B. "To Make Others Condiciones Our Owne:" Metaethical and
Substantive Implications of a Covenant-Based Theory of the
Subject
I have already outlined some broad implications of covenant. First,
covenant implies a view of subjectivity that overcomes the opposition between
Hobbesist atomism and as yet inexplicitly defined feminist-relationist
interpretations. Covenant creates individuality-in-community and, as that
depth of relationship becomes constitutive of personal identity, community-
in-individuality.
Implicit in this view of subjectivity is a commitment to the social
generation of norms-what Gardbaum calls "metaethical communitarianism."
Interestingly, although he challenges at the outset the presumption of a
necessary connection between the antiatomism thesis and any particular
metatethical stance, Gardbaum nowhere justifies that claim. This is so in part,
surely, because his major concern is to save liberalism's privatization of value
from the strong communitarian's claim that life is best lived in community.
But Gardbaum's failure to substantiate the alleged divorce between
antiatomism and metaethics may also be rooted in the difficulty, even
impossibility, of the task.
For where subjectivity is a social construct, and norms are an empirical
element of subjectivity, by definition norms are folded into social
construction. Since no Hobbesist, isolated individuals remain to generate
values independently, one seeks in vain a nonsocial location for metaethics; as
Gertrude Stein said of Oakland, "there is no there there."
But as the covenant model points up, intersubjectivity is symmetrical.
Subjectivity is at once individuality-in-community and community-in-
individuality; society constitutes individuals, and individuals constitute
society. Thus, while Gardbaum's interpretation of intersubjectivity is at best
thin and clearly not exhaustive, it is nevertheless useful when expanded in the
following way. Intersubjectivity means minimally "that, had we been brought
up in a different society .. .we would now be different people."118 It also
means that, had we been brought up in a different society, that society would
generate different norms due to our distinctive mode of participating in the
metaethical process.
Critics like Iris Young might challenge the latter assertion as glib, citing
the historical subordination of, for example, racial minorities, the poor,
women, gays, and lesbians within a culture normalizing racism, class bias,
sexism, and heterosexism. 119 Of course, this developing chorus of diverse
critiques demonstrates empirically that norm generation is not monological
but can be responsive, even if only to an egregiously limited and
unforgiveably tardy extent, to pushes and pulls from societies' constitutive
members. Still, Young might hear Winthrop's sermon to the Puritans aboard
118. Gardbaum, 90 Mich L Rev at 704 (cited in note 4).
119. Young, Politics of Difference at 310-12 (cited in note 19).
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the Arabella, with the requirement that covenant members "be knitt together
• . . as one man, "120 as paradigmatically bad news. Similarly, the U.S.
Constitution feigned to speak for "We, the people," while deliberately
excluding most people from its protections. On this reading, revival of
covenant imagery threatens to strangle nascent critiques before they are fully
heard, subsuming diversity in the totalizing monotone of the dominant
discourse.
But this interpretation of covenant does not follow necessarily; indeed, it is
precisely the meaning of normative constructs, such as covenant, that are
ultimately at issue. Because values are the social creations of socially
constituted entities, the contest shifts from procedure to substance, from
metaethics to first order claims and their practical implications.
And an emancipatory reading of covenant is not only possible, but
compelling. Winthrop demands, for example, that solidarity entail a
willingness "to abridge ourselves of our superfluities, for the supply of others
necessities, wee must uphold a familiar Commerce together in all meekness,
gentleness, patience and liberallity...." 1 2 1 The U.S. Constitution binds us to
"establish Justice," to "promote the General Welfare, and secure the
Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity." The covenant traditions
I have described are fairly mined for their emphases on universal human
dignity, and for their implied demands for substantive guarantees of the
conditions necessary to express that dignity through meaningful participation
in its ongoing reinterpretation, pursuit, and satisfaction.
Thus, the demand that we "make others Condiciones our owne" need not
entail the suppression of diversity. To the contrary, it opens possibilities for
one's own transformation through the imaginative participation in another's
life-world.1 22 Young is correct to note our limited abilities to know ourselves
and others. Yet to overemphasize these limitations is to deny some empirical
realities of intersubjectivity, such as the capacities for sympathy (feeling like
another) and even, occasionally, empathy (feeling with another). Young's
view of subjectivity and intersubjectivity returns us to the Hobbesist isolation
of Pastan's egg, floating at a safe remove from the rusting tools, the snarled
barbed-wire, and muck of the barn below.' 23
In using covenant to reconstruct working definitions of subjectivity, I
contend that rich intersubjective knowledge is possible and that such
knowledge can transform participating subjects. The medium for such
knowledge is narrative, the telling of our stories. Narrative happens under
120. Winthrop, Christian Charity (cited in note 3).
121. Id.
122. See, for example, Sandra Day O'Connor, Thurgood Marshall: The Influence of a Raconteur, 44
Stan L Rev 1217 (1992).
123. Compare Cornell, 133 U Penn L Rev at 370 (cited in note 45) ("Those who assert prior to
entering the conversation that there are no generalizable interests are relying on an ahistorical,
monological view of human nature and the individual subject. They are, in short, just objectivists in
disguise.").
Particularly given Young's political commitments, her approach also brings to mind the powerful
poetry of Carolyn Forche, who urges us to
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conditions ranging from relative intimacy (as within a family, deep friendship,
or religious community) to institutional formality (such as the courtroom).
The content ranges accordingly, from tales of idiosyncratic origins, joys, and
sorrows to grievances of broad generality but high intensity of feeling
(hunger, cold, pain, even procedural or substantive unfairness).
As an example of the relationship between intersubjectivity, metaethics,
and first order value claims, I return to the constitutional subject, the "We the
people" constituted in the Preamble. It is when we recognize that we are
members of one another that our de facto apartheid scars us most deeply, for
we experience covenant betrayed. A covenental "familiar Commerce" would
enable us to begin dismantling our de facto apartheid, healing these deep
wounds, attempting, in Rodney King's words, to "get along,"' 124 even,
perhaps, to "delight in one another . . . rejoyce together, mourne together,
labour and suffer together."' 125
This latent, covenental vision of universal human dignity cannot be
satisfied by classical liberalism's purely procedural guarantees of equality, nor
by the welfare state's neglect of the wealth of human potential wasting in the
streets. Covenant demands substantive guarantees of universal participation
in the ongoing redefinition, pursuit, and realization of its vision. Participation
means. the opportunity to speak and be heard, to meaningfully influence
substantive outcomes. This in turn requires a resurrection of a robust system
of public education, the creation of meaningful work opportunities, and the
satisfaction of conditions necessary for fulfilling those opportunities, such as
affordable health care and child care, and family leave policies. 126 Of course,
covenantal dedication to universal human dignity implicates global policies as
well. 127
everywhere and always
go after that which is lost.
There is a cyclone fence between
ourselves and the slaughter and behind it
we hover in a calm protected world like
netted fish, exactly like netted fish.
It is either the beginning or the end
of the world, and the choice is ourselves
or nothing.
Carolyn Forche, Ourselves or Nothing, in Carolyn Forche, The Country Between Us 55, 59 (Harper & Row,
1981).
124. Alicia Di Rado, Voices from the Community, LA Times, Nuestro Tiempo ed, 5 col 1 (May 21,
1992).
125. Winthrop, Christian Charity (cited in note 3).
126. See, for example, Family and Medical Leave Act of 1991, S 5. In 1990 and 1992, Congress
failed to override presidential vetoes of the Act. See also Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968
Term-Foreword: On Protecting the Poor through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 Harv L Rev 7 (1969).
127. See, for example, Haitian Centers Council, Inc. v McNary, 1992 US App LEXIS 17372, *57 (2d
Cir. 1992) (holding Executive Order 12,807, which allows the U.S. Coast Guard to intercept and
return refugees in international waters, to violate § 243(b)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act,
8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1)) (stay granted, 1992 U.S. Lexis 4766) (cert granted McNay v Haitian Centers
Council, Inc., 1992 US Lexis 5557 (Oct 5, 1992)); contrast U.S. v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188
(1992) (forcible abduction of Mexican national under authority of U.S. officials held not to be barred
by U.S.-Mexico extradition treaty).
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A covenant-informed ethics thus may yield first-order value claims, whose
satisfaction will inevitably clash with liberalism's privatization of value. The
insistence on substantive guarantees of the conditions necessary to realize and
protect universal human dignity compromises the freedom of each person to
pursue untrammeled his subjectively chosen ends. If, as Gardbaum implies
(despite his claims to the contrary), subjective preference is liberalism's
defining criterion, it cannot meaningfully coexist with a covenental
commitment to making equality and autonomous self-realization universally
viable options. l2 8
C. Four Feminist Methodologies
This covenental view of subjectivity, norm generation, and substantive
first-order value claims shares similarities with the feminist approaches of
philosophers Seyla Benhabib and Susan Moller Okin, and legal theorists
Katharine Bartlett and Drucilla Cornell. In this section, I will briefly describe
the methodologies of these four feminist thinkers, and trace connections and
conflicts between their conclusions and those implied by a covenant-based
analysis.
1. Seyla Benhabib's Interactive Universalism. Part II argued that Benhabib's
affiliation of Rawls with Hobbes on the nature of subjectivity is mistaken, and
agreed with Okin that uncritical reliance on a constellation of sharply drawn
dichotomies ill serves feminist theory. Yet Okin's deconstruction of
oppositions between reason and feeling, on one hand, and ethics of
rights/ethics of care on the other, fails to answer Benhabib's critique that the
Rawlsian subject loses all theoretical utility in its vacuous generality. That is,
in becoming everybody, the contractors behind the veil become nobody; and
morally relevant reciprocity cannot exist between ciphers.
Benhabib abandons Rawls' substitutionalist universalism, which erases all
concrete differences between subjects. Her alternative is interactive
universalism, and derives from Habermas' communicative ethics. This
method defines argumentation as the paradigmatic social exercise of reason.
Ideally, dialogue produces consensus, or agreement based solely on the force
of the better argument. 129
Interactive universalism insists on the fullest possible knowledge of "moral
agents about each other, their history, the particulars of their society, its
structure and future." 130 The universalism in her method consists in the
128. Contrast Gardbaum, 90 Mich L Rev at 759-60 (cited in note 4).
129. Benhabib recognizes that the notion of consent is problematic. See, for example, Benhabib,
Afterword at 345 (cited in note 21) ("Consent alone can never be a criterion of anything, neither of
truth nor of moral validity .... We must interpret consent not as an end-goal but as a process for the
cooperative generation of truth or validity."). Compare notes 161-65 and accompanying text.
130. Benhabib, The Generalized and the Concrete Other at 169 (cited in note 13).
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demand that all parties have equal capacities for, and access to, the dialogic
processes through which consensus is created.' 3 '
2. Susan Moller Ohin: Consider Each in Turn. As noted above, Susan Moller
Okin fails fully to deconstruct Benhabib's successful use of the
generalized/concrete dichotomy in her critique of Rawls. Nevertheless, in
creatively responding to the oppositions between reason and feeling, on one
hand, and ethics of right versus ethics of care on the other, Okin creates her
own neo-Rawlsian methodology, and provides an effective standpoint for
feminist critique. Evidence of this is Okin's agreement with Benhabib that
Rawls erases the domestic sphere from critical ethical analysis.'3 2
Okin's insistence that moral agents inform their decisionmaking by
"think[ing] from the position of everybody, in the sense of each in turn'13 3 is very
much like Benhabib's interactive universalism. I3 4 Rather than abstracting
"from all contingencies of human life," Okin's each-in-turn method is "much
closer to an appreciation and concern for social and other human
differences."' 3 5 Her version of the original position requires an imaginative,
empathetic appreciation of each person's distinctive "identities, aims, and
attachments," so much so that we accord them value "equal . . .with our
own."' 3 6 Evidently it is through this neoRawlsian formulation of the Golden
Rule that Okin retains universality within her theory.
3. Katharine Bartlett's Positionality Method. Katharine Bartlett's encyclopedic
Feminist Legal Methods137 describes seven feminist approaches to law.
Feminists might "do" law by asking the woman question, by engaging in
feminist practical reasoning, or by participating in consciousness-raising.
Feminists might "know" in law by adopting one of four stances:
131. See Benhabib, Critique, Norm, and Utopia at ch 8 (cited in note 47). See also id at 285
(citations omitted):
The four conditions of the ideal speech situation are: first, each participant must have an
equal chance to initiate and to continue communication; second, each must have an equal
chance to make assertions, recommendations, and explanations, and to challenge
justifications .... Third, all must have equal chances as actors to express their wishes,
feelings, and intentions; and fourth, the speakers must act as if in contexts of action there is
an equal distribution of chances "to order and resist orders, to promise and to refuse, to be
accountable for one's conduct and to demand accountability from others." [The first two
stipulations] refer[] to speech acts alone and to conditions governing their employment, [and
the last two] require[] a suspension of situations of untruthfulness and duplicity on the one
hand, and of inequality and subordination on the other.
132. But see note 26. Okin rightly points out that Rawls focuses on the family as the primary
source of moral education, and notes the irony of his failure to ensure that this learning lab itself
exemplifies justice. Okin,Justice, Gender, and the Family at 17-23 (cited in note 26).
133. Okin, 99 Ethics at 244 (cited in note 25).
134. Benhabib, The Generalized and the Concrete Other at 168-171 & n33 (cited in note 13).
135. Okin, 99 Ethics at 245 (cited in note 25).
136. Id at 246.
137. 103 Harv L Rev at 829 (cited in note 70).
[Vol. 55: No. 3
RECONSTRUCTIONS OF SUBJECTIVITY
rationalism/empiricism, standpoint epistemology, postmodernism, or
(Bartlett's synthesis of the three) positionality.' 38
Of these seven approaches to law, both feminist practical reasoning and
positionality bear strong similarities to Benhabib's interactive universalism
and Okin's each-in-turn methodology. Feminist practical reasoning, for
Bartlett, is a reformation of Aristotelian phronesis. It involves the integration
of principled, deductive thinking with empathetic, imaginative attention to the
historical, concrete complexity within which legal conflicts are inevitably
imbedded. m3 9 By attending especially to "forms of injustice that otherwise go
unnoticed and unaddressed," feminist practical reasoning demands "the
examination of all perspectives, including those that a court might ultimately
reject."' 140 Because it is only within such a widening perspective that
relevance is redefined, broadly contextual reasoning is a prerequisite for legal
change.14
Positionality recognizes that truths are empirically grounded in the local,
that is, in "particular involvements and relationships."' 142  This stance
therefore accepts the partiality of knowledge, which leads in turn to two
imperatives. First, positionality requires not merely tolerance or openness
toward diversity, but an affirmative commitment to seeking out perspectives
different from one's own. 143  Second, positionality entails an equally
aggressive self-criticism, in order to avoid conflating one's own perspective
with the distinct views of others. 144 Finally, Bartlett presents positionality as a
form of partial, transitory objectivity. It is nonrelativist in its acceptance of
the binding nature of socially created norms within the confines of the
relevant metaethical community. But precisely because those values are
contingently generated, they cannot be construed as either fixed or
universal. ' 45
4. Drucilla Cornell's Hegelian Dialogism. Drucilla Cornell accepts much of the
prevailing critique of the liberal subject, but finds that decentered,
intersubjectively constituted personality "does not dissolve . . .totally in an
138. Id at 880-86. The similarity between Okin's methodology and Bartlett's is also noted in
Karen Czapanskiy, Volunteers and Draftees: The Struggle for Parental Equality, 38 UCLA L Rev at 1415,
1464 n178 (1991); Linda Hirschman links Bartlett's method to Aristotelian phronesis in The Book of
"A," 70 Tex L Rev 971, 974-79 (1992). Benhabib's theory traces back to phronesis as well via
Gadamer and Hegel. See Benhabib, Critique, Norm, and Utopia at 84 (cited in note 47); Benhabib,
Afterword at 330-34 (cited in note 21).
139. Bartlett, 103 Harv L Rev at 849-63 (cited in note 70).
140. Id at 861, 863.
141. Id at 863 ("The shift from Plessy v. Ferguson to Brown v. Board of Education, for example, rested
upon the expansion of the 'legally relevant' in race discrimination cases to include the actual
experiences of black Americans and the inferiority implicit in segregation." (citations omitted)).
142. Id at 880.
143. Id at 881-83. This extends to appreciating "the position of men whose social conditioning
leads them to interpret the actions of some women as 'inviting' rather than discouraging sexual
encounter" when advocating redefinition of rape laws. Id at 882.
144. Id at 883.
145. Id at 885.
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all-encompassing community."'' 46 She strives to rebuild ethical theory upon
the changed understanding of the subject and its relationship to its
constitutive context. Dissatisfied with the neoAristotelian approaches in
Alasdair MacIntyre's After Virtue and Roberto Unger's Passion, Cornell
proposes that a Hegelian dialogic universalism best accommodates both
meaningful autonomy and "the kind of community life necessary if value
judgments are to carry normative weight." 147
Cornell's approach, like Benhabib's, branches from Habermas'
communicative ethics.' 48 Unlike Benhabib, however, Cornell relies directly
and heavily on Habermas' Hegelian roots. Thus, individual consciousness is
"a delicate interactive achievement," produced in the dialectic interaction
between self and other. Again, identity is an intersubjective construct, the
consequence of knowing "oneself as a self by being mirrored in the eyes of
others."'' 49 The tension built into this process of identity formation saves the
subject from subsumption in community; "difference from the other is at the
same time a relationship to the other."'' 5 0
Hegelian subjectivity emerges within, and is therefore constituted by, a
"linguistic life-world that embodies a set of traditions and a community."''
Habermas helps Cornell to spell out in some detail the metaethical stance
implicit in a dialogic community: "[U]niversality ... mean[s] that each of us is
to be recognized as a participant in the conversation; each voice is to count
and no one is to be silenced in the name of a substantive universal that
denounces what is different as not being really human."'' 52
Through her reliance on the Hegelian dialectic, Cornell avoids Benhabib's
entanglement in dichotomies. She thus recasts as polarities the sharp
oppositions first, between universality and particularity (Benhabib's
"generalized and concrete"), and, second, between sameness and difference.
Universality is grounded in equal participation in the dialogic community; but
that participation is exercised only in particular, concrete contexts. Dialogue
also requires the simultaneous recognition of the other's sameness (his or her
instantiation of universal, equal participation in dialogue) and difference
(since "[t]o assimilate the other is to end the conversation")., 53 As a
regulative ideal, then, Cornell's dialogism is both a means to identify common
goods ("generalizable interests") and a normative push toward realizing the
conditions necessary for genuinely reciprocal participation.' 54
5. Connections and Conflicts. Gardbaum's categories are useful for organizing
a comparison and contrast of the approaches described above. I examine
146. Cornell, 133 U Pa L Rev at 299 (cited in note 45).
147. Id at 358.
148. Id at 366-72.
149. Id at 361.
150. Id at 364 n361.
151. Idat 361.
152. Id at 368; compare notes 161-65 and accompanying text.
153. Cornell, 133 U Pa L Rev at 369 (cited in note 45).
154. Id at 370, 375.
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first, the respective views on the nature of subjectivity; second, the metaethics
or methodologies; and third, the substantive or first-order value claims. I
concur with Gardbaum that the more compelling, and complete, arguments
attend explicitly to all three elements.
Of the five models sketched above, Bartlett's and Okin's define least
explicitly their working notions of subjectivity. For example, I interpret
covenant as offering resources for a new take on intersubjectivity, by
grounding it in deep commitment or promissory obligation that, as a
relationship, becomes constitutive of identity. Freedom is located in the
"elbow room" created by covenant, within which actions are contextualized as
making, keeping, breaking, or reinterpreting covenant. This view of the
subject entails both individuality-in-community and community-in-
individuality.
The covenental model is perhaps most similar to Cornell's dialogism, in
that both reject reliance on sharp dichotomies and seek instead to deconstruct
such oppositions. And, like the covenant approach, Cornell explicitly
advocates an intersubjective anthropology. Both methods find the major
challenge in reconstructing ethics to be the formulation of a compelling
account of the relationship between individual and community, which neither
sacrifices the benefits of liberalism's autonomy nor falls into its atomistic or
objectivist fallacies.
Benhabib's acceptance of the Hegelian critique, as expanded by
Habermas, also links her methodology closely with Cornell's. Significantly,
for the covenant model, for Cornell, and for Benhabib, premises regarding
the intersubjective construction of personality segu6 smoothly into
metaethics. The commitment at the heart of covenental relationship is the
locus of ceaseless, and by definition, ethical, activity: covenant is constantly
affirmed, broken, redefined. The covenant emphasis on narrative, like
Cornell's dialogism and Benhabib's interactive universalism, posits the
simultaneity of subjective and normative construction. That is, both
individual agents and the value-systems within which they emerge are
communicative products. We are constituted by our dialogic communities,
yet able to change those communities, and ourselves, through communicative
action. Finally, these stances resonate with the primary values of equality and
the common good inherent in the covenant tradition. 55
Okin's each-in-turn method and Bartlett's positionality approach are more
ambiguous regarding their working interpretations of subjectivity. Of the five
models presented here, Okin's appears most deeply rooted in liberal
feminism. She is least attentive to postmodernism's radical critiques of the
liberal subject. Her reformation of Rawls' original position, for example,
consists primarily in reinserting the affect that Rawls deliberately abstracts
away. On the other hand, Okin fully recognizes that emotions and values are
socially mediated. She zeroes in on the nuclear family as the locus of that
155. Compare notes 161-65 and accompanying text with text accompanying note 152.
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mediation, however, and spends most of her critical energy expanding Rawls'
theory of justice to encompass gender relations.
Bartlett's view of subjectivity, although better articulated than Okin's,
remains ambiguous. Bartlett shares with Okin and the others an explicit
recognition that knowledge is socially mediated. She notes that "individual
and community [are] . . . necessarily interdependent."'' 5 6 Yet her focus
throughout the discussion of positionality remains quite closely on singular
epistemological processes. Each individual is irrevocably trapped within his
or her drastically particular perspective. 157 Transcendence is impossible, but
through "self-discipline," one may attain a broader view. 158 The foremost
end in sight appears to be "self-knowledge," since "the source of community
is its diversity."' 159 To the extent that Bartlett retains any notion of
universality, then, it seems synonymous with Iris Young's "inexhaustible
heterogeneity." 160
Bartlett's failure to explicate a working interpretation of subjectivity leaves
us to wrestle with an implied view of the subject as primarily a (Cartesian?)
individuated knower. Thus, it is unclear whether the subject is frozen or freed
by positionality. This result is problematic, particularly given the
epistemology and substantive value claims that Bartlett advocates. For, like
the other methodologies, Bartlett rejects the veil of ignorance, supposing that
greater knowledge, not lesser, yields the more liberating result. With
Benhabib and Cornell, Bartlett explicitly assumes that truths are partial and
changeable due to the finite nature of concrete existence. Thus, each places
optimal value on broad, authentic intersubjective communication.
Practically, then, each of these feminist approaches assumes some
significant level of communicative skill, and a willingness not only to speak but
also to hear diverse points of view. Each also requires the capacity for
empathy. This presumes the abilities first, to abstract from the concrete
particularities of one's own subject-position and second, to reimmerse in the
concrete by experiencing another's subject-position to some meaningful
extent. This is the gift of "mak[ing] others Condicions our owne."
With a further expansion of her epistemology, preferably through a
clearer articulation of her views on subjectivity, Bartlett could begin to help
answer the difficult questions that remain for each of these feminist
approaches regarding the generation of moral feeling. How do we identify
the broadest range of positions different from our own? Under what
conditions are those differences communicable? How does such
communication affect speakers and listeners?
156. Bartlett, 103 Harvard L Rev at 886 (cited in note 70).
157. Id at 882.
158. Idat881.
159. Id at 886, citing Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Foreword: Traces of Self-
Government, 100 Harv L Rev 4, 32 (1986). This thesis implies that we must be committed to coalition
politics.
160. Young, Politics of Difference at 301 (cited in note 19).
[Vol. 55: No. 3
RECONSTRUCTIONS OF SUBJECTIVITY
On the other hand, Bartlett's method provides a crucial contribution to
feminist analysis. This contribution lies in her insistence that a commitment
to ongoing self-criticism is imperative to balance, at least partially, the human
tendency to conflate one's own highly particular truths into universals.' 6'
Related to this is Bartlett's rejection of consensus as positionality's goal,
which distinguishes her from Benhabib's strongly Habermasian approach. 162
The concern, to which Bartlett and Iris Young devote special attention, is the
tendency of enforced unity to supress diversity.
Both Benhabib and Cornell recognize the criticism as apt. Benhabib
responds in part by shifting the context of communicative ethics from
juridical-procedural to democratic-participatory, in order to emphasize the
plurality of competing voices joining in the communicative process. 163
Cornell responds by contextualizing Habermas' theory as a critique of
decisionism, in order to emphasize the real possibility of shared interests.164
From a covenant perspective, similarities have already been noted between
positionality's methodological commitments to self-criticism and to seeking
out diverse perspectives, and Biblical emphases on humility, and on a radical
depth and breadth of compassion that includes even the oppressor. 165
Arguably, however, none of these responses can fully allay Bartlett's concern.
To the contrary, these approaches should incorporate positionality's dual
demands for self-criticism and deliberate attention to diversity.
Thus reformulated, each method can provide for more effective
integration of the general and concrete, of universality and difference, of
community and individuality. In this sense, each approach resonates with the
process of legal reasoning, with its commitment to the construction of general
rules and the careful application of those rules to particular factual settings.
Yet these methodologies do not share law's loyalty to precedent. To the
contrary, feminist critiques demand the identification and dismantling of
gendered hierarchies.
When feminists heed the call, articulated both by Bartlett and by covenant
traditions, to celebrate and nurture universal human dignity, our task expands
to encompass the identification and revolution of all forms of exclusion and
domination. These commitments inevitably collide with liberalism's
privatization of value. Such collisions are also opportunities for ethical
161. There is a powerful resonance between her thesis and Gutierrez' assertion that liberation
theology must view the Kingdom of God as an "ever-receding horizon," to check the human
tendency to equate the status quo--whether revolutionary or reactionary-with true justice.
Gutierrez, A Theology of Liberation at 174, 238 (cited in note 95). Although Bartlett refers to God's
unique capacity for self-criticism, she does not conclude that the human capacity for self-criticism
may depend as much on grace as on works. See Bartlett, 103 Harv L Rev 883 & n244 (cited in note
70).
162. Contrast Benhabib, The Generalized and the Concrete Other at 169 (cited in note 13), with
Bartlett, 103 Harv L Rev at 883 (cited in note 70) ("Positionality is not a strategy of process and
compromise that seeks to reconcile all competing interests."); but see note 129.
163. Benhabib, Critique, Norm, and Utopia at 285-88, 309-316, 405-06 n77 (cited in note 47); see
also Benhabib, Afterword at 345 (cited in note 21).
164. Cornell, 133 U Pa L Rev at 369-70 (cited in note 45).
165. See notes 143, 161 and accompanying text.
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reconstruction and are, therefore, like Pastan's egg, ambiguous. In its lovely
solitude, the egg reflects a light bathing it from without. Yet it also promises
new life. Broken, it looks like the sun. We determine whether each "delicate
crack of lightning" signifies our devouring or our nourishing one another.
CONCLUSION
Inspired by feminist critiques of Rawls' social contract theory, this essay
sought to derive from the covenant paradigm a means to overcome the
opposition between individualists and relationists over the meaning of
subjectivity. I have begun to trace some implications of covenant-informed
views of subjectivity for metaethics/methodology and for substantive, first-
order value claims. Obviously, one cannot fabricate a total theory of covenant
alone. Nor, given its ambiguity, can it be stitched piecemeal into existing
theories. Nevertheless, the paradigm retains distinctive emancipatory
potential. In complement with feminist critiques, and colored by insights
from communicative or dialogic ethics, covenant may yet contribute usefully
to theories of justice, particularly by regenerating our commitments to
celebrate and nurture universal human dignity.
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